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A VIEW FROM THE BENCH: WHY JUDGES
FAIL TO PROTECT TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
IN THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP-AN
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Lindsay R. Goldstein*
INTRODUCTION
The lawyer-client relationship stands at the epicenter of our legal
system. Part historical treasure, part myth, it is the subject of endless
cultural fascination and rhetoric.
In theory, the lawyer-client
relationship approximates a sacred trust between a lawyer and a
client. This relationship is characterized by open communication and
complete confidentiality, which fosters the client's trust in the lawyer,
and the lawyer's steadfast loyalty to the client. In practice however,
not all relationships between a lawyer and a client conform to this,
arguably aspirational, model. Instead, communication between a
lawyer and a client may be strained, or even nonexistent, leading to a
relationship characterized by mutual mistrust and dissatisfaction.
The lawyer-client relationship is, quite simply, in dire straights.
This is particularly true in the criminal justice system, where the
former foundational elements of trust and confidence appear to be
eroding in the face of overwhelming judicial skepticism.1 Perhaps this
is inevitable when judges, called upon to assess alleged breakdowns in
the lawyer-client relationship,' are restricted in their inquiries by the
confidential nature of the lawyer-client relationship.' Privy only to
general information regarding an alleged breakdown, judges'
appraisals of the lawyer-client relationship appear to be guided
primarily by their skepticism of criminal defendants and their
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Bruce A. Green for his invaluable insight and guidance, as well as his
extraordinary commitment to the writing process. I am grateful, as always, to my
family for their continuing support and encouragement. And lastly, to Matthew
Tossman, who already does so much, and still read every word.
1. See infra Parts II.B.2.a-b (discussing judges' apparent skepticism of criminal
defendants and their defense lawyers, respectively).
2. See infra text accompanying note 61 (noting judges' roles in terminating the
lawyer-client relationship during litigation).
3. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (explaining the lawyer's ethical
obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship).
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lawyers. 4 This results in a greater likelihood that a lawyer-client
relationship lacking in trust and confidence will continue in the
context of the criminal justice system than in civil litigation.'
Consider the following true scenario from the criminal justice
system as an example of this recurring problem: Defendant Joe Ed
Earp refused to cooperate with a sheriff's deputy who was
investigating an attempted bank robbery, and instead taunted the
deputy by yelling, "Bring it on, pig." 6 After a physical struggle, which
involved several deputies, Earp was arrested and convicted during a
jury trial of "deterring an executive officer from performing a lawful
duty."7 The trial was bifurcated so as to fairly assess Earp's prior
convictions for sentencing purposes; however, before the second
phase of the trial began, Earp requested that he be permitted to
replace his appointed lawyer.' Earp believed that his court-appointed
colluding with the prosecutor and described his trial as a
lawyer was
"set up."9 The appointed lawyer confirmed the breakdown in his
relationship with Earp by stating as follows:
[T]he attorney-client relationship, in my opinion, appears to have
broken down to the extent that he has absolutely no confidence in
me. During the five minutes that the court gave us alone, although I
will not get into what we discussed, the fact of the matter was that it
that the attorney-client relationship had completely
appeared to me
10
broken down.
Nevertheless, the trial judge denied Earp's motion to substitute
counsel. 1 The appellate court affirmed this decision, finding that the
asserted conflict was not irreconcilable, 2 and that the trial judge's
skepticism of the defendant's request for, and the defense lawyer's
support of, the motion to substitute counsel was reasonable. 3
Earp's case continues to be demonstrative of the threat to trust and
confidence in the lawyer-client relationship in the criminal justice
system. This Note undertakes a comparison of the judiciary's current
approach to ending the lawyer-client relationship in civil litigation and

4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. People v. Earp, No. F041724, 2003 WL 22368871, at *1 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003).
7. id.
8. Id. at *3.
9. Id. at *4.
10. Id. Notably, Earp's defense lawyer explicitly references his inability to
disclose details of the alleged breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship to the
judge. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *7.
13. Id. at *6.
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in the criminal justice system. 4 This Note suggests reforming the
current procedure in the criminal justice system for ruling on motions
to withdraw or to substitute counsel so that judges may act to protect,
rather than to undermine, trust and confidence between a criminal
defendant and his lawyer. 5
Part I explores traditional expectations for the lawyer-client
relationship by examining its core values-trust and confidence-as
articulated by the judiciary and by the ethical standards of the legal
profession. This part also provides a framework for understanding
termination of the lawyer-client relationship in civil litigation 6 and in
the criminal justice system, where the Sixth Amendment is heavily
implicated. 7
Part II of this Note thematically presents judges' views of the
lawyer-client relationship using language from court opinions that
address motions to withdraw or to substitute counsel. The judiciary's
approach to ending the lawyer-client relationship in civil litigation 8
and in the criminal justice system19 are considered in turn. Where
possible, the same themes are discussed to facilitate a comparison of
the judiciary's view of the lawyer-client relationship in each context.
Finally, Part III of this Note concludes that requiring unduly
skeptical judges to rule on motions to withdraw or to substitute
counsel using a procedure that provides them with woefully
inadequate information regarding alleged breakdowns in the lawyerclient relationship, results in less protection for trust and confidence in
the lawyer-client relationship in the criminal justice system than in
civil litigation.2" This part argues for and discusses the benefits of
revising the procedure for ruling on motions to withdraw or to
substitute counsel in the criminal justice system to include an
independent lawyer who acts as the court's fact-finder."

14. See infra Parts II.A-B (discussing the judiciary's approach to ending the
lawyer-client relationship in civil litigation and in the criminal justice system,
respectively).
15. See infra Part III.B (proposing the appointment of an independent lawyer to
serve as the court's fact-finder in certain instances where a breakdown in the lawyerclient relationship is alleged). While the discussion in Part II.B of this Note is not
limited to the lawyer-client relationship between an indigent criminal defendant and
his appointed lawyer, the proposal for reform suggested in Part II1.B is limited in
scope, and is intended only to apply to lawyer-client relationships where the defense
lawyer has been appointed by the court. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part I.C.2.a.
17. See infra Part I.C.2.b.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Part III.B.
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I. TRADITIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF THE
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

This part provides a glimpse into the lawyer-client relationship,
from the judiciary's traditional understanding to our modern
conception, as reflected in the current ethical standards of the legal
profession. In addition, this part explores how the termination of the
lawyer-client relationship during litigation, both by motions to
withdraw or by motions to substitute counsel, is regulated by the
profession and the bench. Finally, this part closely examines the
procedural differences of ending the lawyer-client relationship in the
contexts of civil litigation and the criminal justice system.
A. The Foundation: Trust and Confidence
American jurisprudence has long distinguished the lawyer-client
relationship from other forms of contractual relationships.22
Following suit, organizations within the American legal community23
have attempted to articulate just why this division exists, and why it
Overwhelmingly, the judiciary and these
should continue.
professional authorities have focused on elements of trust and
confidence, which are central to the lawyer-client relationship. 4 Part
I.A.1 discusses the American judiciary's and legal community's
historical expectations of trust and confidence within the lawyer-client
relationship, while Part I.A.2 discusses the practical significance of
these views.
1. Expectations of the Bench
Judges describing the lawyer-client relationship frequently cite trust
and confidence as its quintessential elements. 25 Typically, these terms
22. See In re Dunn, 98 N.E. 914, 916 (N.Y. 1912) (noting "the relationship of
attorney and client.., is subject to principles and rules which do not apply to an
ordinary contract"). Judge Irving Younger famously and concisely characterized the
lawyer-client relationship as a "unique contract." Battani, Ltd. v. Bar-Car, Ltd., 299
N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (Civ. Ct. 1969). For a further discussion of the unusual elements of
the lawyer-client contract, see infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
23. These organizations include the American Bar Association ("ABA") and the
American Law Institute ("ALl"). For a more in-depth discussion of the ABA's
history of articulating the role of lawyers in American society and the ethical
standards of the legal profession, see infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Parts I.A.1-2.
25. See United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24, 24 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889). The Costen
court described the importance of trust in the lawyer-client relationship by stating the
following:
Now, it is the glory of our profession that its fidelity to its client can be
depended on; that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him
upon his rights.., with the absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue is
tied from ever disclosing it; and any lawyer who proves false to such an
obligation... is guilty of the grossest breach of trust.... I cannot tolerate
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refer to the client's trust and confidence in the lawyer's abilities and
loyalty. One judge described the reciprocal nature of the lawyerclient relationship as "one of an unusual character .... There lie at its
foundation the elements of trust and confidence on the part of the
client and of undivided loyalty and devotion on the part of the
attorney which render the relationship a personal and confidential
one ... "26 Judges adhere to this notion because of the widely held
belief that without the client's complete trust, the lawyer's ability to
serve the client would be severely impaired. 27 Accordingly, trust and

confidence between a client and lawyer are viewed as prerequisites
for a properly functioning relationship 28 and for effective legal
representation.2 9 Importantly, the judiciary's institutional emphasis
on trust and confidence has permeated our current expectations of the
lawyer-client relationship." An examination of the legal profession's
ethical standards illustrates this point.
2. Expectations of the Profession: The Model Rules
The principles of trust and confidence are similarly central to the
American Bar Association's conception of the lawyer-client
relationship, as articulated by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct3 1 ("Model Rules"). The Model Rules were not, however, the
American Bar Association's first attempt at formalizing ethical
guidelines for the legal profession. In 1908, the American Bar
Association ("ABA") adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics.3 2
Criticized as "vague and self-contradictory,"33 the Canons were
replaced in 1969 when the ABA adopted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Model Code").34 In 1983 the ABA
for a moment, neither can the profession, neither can the community, any
disloyalty on the part of a lawyer to his client.
Id.; see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 & n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. In re Dunn, 98 N.E. at 915.
27. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
28. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 24 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that the
lawyer-client relationship "'involves not just the casual assistance of a member of the
bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state
of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney"' (quoting Smith v.
Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65, 74 (Cal. 1968))).
29. See Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Basic trust between
counsel and defendant is the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective
assistance of counsel."); see also Wolgin v. Smith, No. CIV.A.94-7471, 1996 WL
482943, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996) (stating that "trust and confidence... is the
cornerstone of the lawyer client relationship and ... will be essential to effective trial
preparation").
30. See infra Part I.A.2.
31. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct (1983) (amended 2003).
32. Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyer's Ethics § 1.03,
at 4 (2d ed. 2002).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 5.
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again changed course, adopting the Model Rules. 35 The Model Rules
have been amended several times since 1983, including substantial
amendments in 2002, and then additional amendments in 2003.36 In

their current form, the Model Rules "provide a framework for the
ethical practice of law., 37 They also provide a framework for
understanding how principles of trust and confidence shape the
lawyer-client relationship.
The characteristic of trust so frequently remarked upon by judges is

understood by the Model Rules as "the hallmark of the client-lawyer
relationship. ' 38 Notably, protecting trust in the lawyer-client
relationship is a key rationale for the lawyer's ethical obligation to

maintain the client's confidentiality. 39 According to this reasoning,
absent this trust between the client and his lawyer, the client's full
disclosure of information relating to the representation would be
unlikely, making effective representation nearly impossible.4" In
addition to keeping client confidences,41 the Model Rules construe
lawyers' duties as including the duty to represent their clients
a
competently 42 and diligently.4 3 These duties apply to all aspects of 44

lawyer's engagement, and are not limited to the litigation context.

Similarly, the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement") describes the lawyer as a
"fiduciary '45 and explicitly articulates a duty of loyalty.46 This

35. Id. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") format,
however, still remains the framework for standards in some jurisdictions, including
New York. Id.
36. Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, 2004 Selected Standards on
Professional Responsibility, at v (2004).
37. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct pmbl. para. 16 (1983) (amended 2003). It is
important to note that while the ABA promulgates ethical standards for the legal
profession, those standards are not enforceable against a lawyer unless adopted by
the jurisdiction in which he practices. Freedman & Smith, supra note 32, § 1.03, at 2
n.1.
38. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 2.
39. Id.
40. Comment 2 to Model Rule 1.6 recognizes that often, it is the "embarrassing or
legally damaging" information that is critical to the representation. Id. Therefore, it
is only by maintaining a client's confidence, thereby gaining his trust, that a lawyer is
able to effectively represent his client. See id.; see also Freedman & Smith, supra note
32, § 5.02, at 128 ("The lawyer is in a position to offer ...good counsel ... only if the
client is willing to entrust the lawyer with information that might be embarrassing or
incriminating.").
41. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 (1983).
42. Id. R. 1.1.
43. Id. R. 1.3.
44. See id. pmbl. para. 2 (describing the lawyer's role as advisor, advocate,
negotiator, and evaluator).
45. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 16 cmt. b (2000).
46. Id. The duty of loyalty is arguably implied by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules") in the Rules Pertaining to Conflicts of Interest and Duties
to Former Clients. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9.
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of the lawyer-client

B. Termination of the Lawyer-Client Relationship

Given the intimate nature of the lawyer-client relationship, it is
perhaps not surprising that its termination is a delicate and sometimes
vigorously contested matter, which is closely regulated by both the

legal profession and the bench. Part I.B.1 discusses how the lawyer's
duties to the client impact the lawyer's ability to withdraw from the

lawyer-client relationship, while Part I.B.2 examines the judiciary's
nebulous definition of good cause
withdrawal during litigation.

and its effect on lawyers'

1. The Asymmetry of the Right to Terminate the Lawyer-Client

Relationship
The judiciary has traditionally understood the right to terminate the
Clients are, with few
lawyer-client relationship as asymmetrical."

exceptions,48 permitted to discharge their lawyers at any time for any

reason. 49 Lawyers, on the other hand, are significantly more restricted

in their ability to withdraw from the lawyer-client relationship." This
doctrine contemplates the lawyer's unwavering faithfulness to the
client's cause, except in the few instances where "good cause" is
47. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 cmt. b (internal
citations omitted). The Restatement explains that "[a] client ordinarily should not be
forced to put important legal matters into the hands of another or to accept unwanted
legal services." Id.
48. A notable exception is with regard to a criminal defendant's ability to
discharge his appointed lawyer, which may be subject to applicable law or result in
the defendant's self representation. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16 cmt. 5.
49. See In re Dunn, 98 N.E. 914, 916 (N.Y. 1912) ("It is well established in the case
of the client that he may at any time for any reason which seems satisfactory to him,
however arbitrary, discharge his attorney."); see also Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., No. 81
Civ. 5224, 1989 WL 88709, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1989) (noting that "where a client
wishes to halt representation by current counsel, no cause is required"); Battani, Ltd.
v. Bar-Car, Ltd., 299 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (describing the underlying
contract of the lawyer-client relationship as one that "[t]he client may breach.., at
will"). The Model Rules generally support this proposition. See Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 1.16 cmt. 4. Also, the Model Rules make clear that discharging the
lawyer does not absolve the client of liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Id.
For a discussion of exceptions to the client's ability to terminate the lawyer-client
relationship at will, see supra note 48.
50. See Rindner v. Cannon Mills, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
("When an attorney is retained to conduct a legal proceeding, he enters into an entire
contract to conduct the proceeding to a conclusion and he may not abandon his
relation without reasonable or justifiable cause." (internal citations omitted)); see also
United States v. Ramey, 559 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) ("By accepting
employment as counsel for [the defendant], his attorney of record herein stipulated
impliedly that he would represent his client in this matter to a conclusion."). For an
in-depth discussion of the Model Rules' restrictions on a lawyer's ability to terminate
a representation, see infra Part I.C.1.
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present to terminate the lawyer-client relationship." The question
then arises: What constitutes good cause for a lawyer to withdraw
from a lawyer-client relationship?
2. The Challenge of Defining "Good Cause"

The cases

that the most obvious and

suggest

consistent

characteristic of good cause is its ambiguity. 2 The fact is that, "[a]part

from obvious cases,..

.

what constitutes reasonable or justifiable

cause is not so readily stated."

3

There are, however, a few elements

of good cause that are uniformly recognized. First, judges evaluating
good cause use an objective standard.54 Also, while loss of trust alone
is not sufficient to constitute good cause,55 the cases suggest that good
cause exists where there has been a complete breakdown of the
lawyer-client relationship.56 The definition of a complete breakdown
is also hazy, 7 but judges seem to characterize the conflict as a

complete breakdown if the state of trust and confidence between the
lawyer and client is irrevocably compromised.58 Often this is the case

51. See ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Informal Ethics Op. 807 (1965). The
opinion declares the following:
The right of an attorney or counsel to withdraw from employment, once
assumed, arises only from good cause. Even the desire or consent of the
client is not always sufficient. The lawyer should not throw up the
unfinished task to the detriment of his client except for reasons of honor or
self-respect.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re Dunn, 98 N.E. at
916 (recognizing "good and sufficient cause" as an appropriate ground for the
lawyer's withdrawal from the representation); Battani, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 631 ("The
attorney may terminate the relation upon good cause.").
52. See Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co., 237 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Mich. Ct. App.
1975) ("'What is a sufficient good cause to justify an attorney in abandoning a case in
which he has been retained has not been laid down by any general rule, and in the
nature of things cannot be .... ' (quoting Genrow v. Flynn, 131 N.W. 1115, 1116
(Mich. 1911))).
53. Rindner, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
54. See United States v. Myers, 294 F.3d 203, 206 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Good cause
depends on objective reasonableness; it cannot be gauged solely by ascertaining the
defendant's state of mind.").
55. United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 1986) ("Although loss of trust
is certainly a factor in assessing good cause, it is, standing alone, insufficient.").
56. See Ambrose, 237 N.W.2d at 522 (finding good cause where there was a "total
breakdown" in the lawyer-client relationship).
57. This is true largely because judges exercise tremendous discretion when
determining whether a complete breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship exists.
See infra notes 81, 96 and accompanying text.
58. See Ambrose, 237 N.W.2d at 522-23 (finding good cause where the conflict
between the lawyer and the client "'result[s] in the destruction of all faith in each
other and render[s] it impossible for them to further co-operate"' (quoting Genrow v.
Flynn, 131 N.W. 1115, 1116 (Mich. 1911))); see also In re Dunn, 98 N.E. 914, 915
(N.Y. 1912) (suggesting that good cause to terminate the lawyer-client relationship
exists where either the client's confidence in the lawyer or the lawyer's allegiance to
the client is compromised). But see Myers, 294 F.3d at 206 (observing that "'[l]oss of
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where communication between the lawyer and the client is so severely
strained that it becomes essentially nonexistent.5 ' The rationale for
this threshold is that effective representation is impossible where a
total breakdown of the relationship occurs. 6 ' Elements of this
doctrine are reflected in the judiciary's and the profession's formal
treatment of the termination of the lawyer-client relationship during
litigation.
C. Standardsfor Termination of the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Termination of the lawyer-client relationship is governed by a dual
set of standards: those expressed in the Model Rules, and those
articulated by the judiciary. While the Model Rules provide ethical
guidance for the profession, the authority to terminate the lawyerclient relationship during litigation ultimately rests with the
judiciary.6 1 This Note next examines these standards in detail. Part
I.C.1 discusses the relevant provision of the Model Rules, while Part
I.C.2 explores the judicial standards for termination of the lawyerclient relationship, specifically within the procedural framework of
motions to withdraw in civil litigation 2 and motions to withdraw or to
substitute counsel during a criminal proceeding.6 3
1. The Model Rules' Standards for Termination
Model Rule 1.16 governs a lawyer's ethical obligations with regard
to declining or terminating a representation. 64 For the purposes of
termination, Rule 1.16 contemplates two types of withdrawal:
mandatory 65 and permissive.6 6 While the circumstances that require a
trust, standing alone, is insufficient"' to constitute good cause for the substitution of
counsel (quoting United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95,108 (1st Cir. 2002))).
59. See Wolgin v. Smith, No. CIV.A.94-7471, 1996 WL 482943, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 21, 1996) (finding that trust and confidence in the lawyer-client relationship had
been destroyed where the conflict between the client and the lawyer escalated to the
point that they could only communicate in writing); Miller v. State, 29 P.3d 1077,
1087-88 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (finding a complete breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship where lawyers conceded that the defendant did not trust them and where
communication between the defendant and his lawyers ultimately ceased entirely).
60. See United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that an "irreconcilable conflict" prevented the appointed lawyer from
providing effective representation); see also Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170
(9th Cir. 1970) (finding representation nonexistent where the lawyer and client were
"embroiled in irreconcilable conflict"). This idea is also reflected in the Model Rules.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
61. Model Rule 1.16 remains the operative standard for withdrawal from
transactional and all other types of non-litigious representation. Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 1.16 (1983) (amended 2003).
62. See infra Part I.C.2.a.
63. See infra Part I.C.2.b.
64. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16.
65. Id. at R. 1.16(a).
66. Id. at R. 1.16(b).
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lawyer to withdraw are fairly straightforward,67 those that trigger the

possibility of an optional withdrawal are far more imprecise.68 For
example, a lawyer may have the option to withdraw where "the client
insists on taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with
which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement,
70

69

and where

"other good cause for withdrawal exists." Notably, however,
withdrawal under either the mandatory or permissive provisions

requires approval by the relevant tribunal.7 1 In the event that the
appropriate tribunal declines to approve the lawyer's withdrawal, the

lawyer is bound to continue the representation, regardless of the
circumstances that may favor termination of the lawyer-client
relationship. 72

Finally, if the withdrawal is approved, the lawyer

67. Rule 1.16 requires a lawyer to withdraw from a representation where "(1) the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other
law; (2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's
ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged." Id. at R. 1.16(a)(1)-(3).
68. Rule 1.16 permits a lawyer to withdraw from a representation where:
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client; (2) the client persists in a course of action involving
the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
fraudulent; (3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime
or fraud; (4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers
repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; (5) the
client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the
lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will
withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; (6) the representation will result
in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered
unreasonably difficult by the client; or (7) other good cause for withdrawal
exists.
Id. at R. 1.16(b)(1)-(7). The vagueness of Rule 1.16 serves at least one clear purpose.
A lawyer's full disclosure to the tribunal of the exact circumstances precipitating his
motion to withdraw would likely violate the confidentiality mandate of Rule 1.6. See
id. R. 1.6.
69. Id. at R. 1.16(b)(4).
70. Id. at R. 1.16(b)(7). For an in-depth discussion of what constitutes good
cause, see supra Part I.B.2. Interestingly, Model Rule 1.16 does not explicitly
mention breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship as an appropriate ground for
withdrawal from a representation. The Restatement, however acknowledges that
"[ilrreparable breakdown of the client-lawyer relationship ... is likewise a ground for
withdrawal." Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 32 cmt. 1 (2000).
71. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(c). At least one student commentator
has suggested that the requirement of tribunal approval is ethically problematic for
lawyers. See Jessica R. John, Note, I Gotta Get Out of This Case: Withdrawalfrom
Representation as a Public Defender, 10 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 152, 165 (2000) (noting
that "[lawyers' oaths bind them to these rules; however, judges can effectively force
their violation").
72. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(c). The Restatement suggests that "[i]f
the tribunal improperly requires a lawyer to continue representation, the usual
remedy for the lawyer or client is to appeal the order and obey it in the meantime."
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 31 cmt. c. It should be noted
here that where a lawyer has a legal obligation to withdraw from the representation,
the tribunal's requirement that the lawyer continue the representation would not then
subject the lawyer to disciplinary proceedings. The lawyer's ethical obligations are
considered legally satisfied upon his bringing the motion to withdraw, and not upon
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retains a duty to protect the client's interests "to the extent reasonably
practicable. 73 These standards provided by the Model Rules are,
concededly, subject to tremendous judicial discretion and, therefore,
might not be an accurate reflection of the judiciary's approach to the
lawyer-client relationship. For this reason, standards for termination
of the lawyer-client relationship, as articulated by the judiciary, are
discussed below.
2. The Judiciary's Standards for Termination
The judiciary's primary opportunity to address termination of the
lawyer-client relationship arises in conjunction with the disposition of
withdrawal or substitution of counsel motions, most of which are
resolved without a published opinion. 74 As a result, there is relatively
limited decisional law that substantively discusses terminating the
lawyer-client relationship due to its total breakdown.7 5 Additionally,
the procedural context in which these motions are raised, dramatically
impacts the judge's analysis. Part I.C.2.a discusses the framework for
judicial analysis of withdrawal motions in civil litigation. Then, Part
I.C.2.b explores the much more complex task of evaluating motions to
withdraw or to substitute counsel in the criminal justice system. Part
I.C.2.b includes a discussion of the Sixth Amendment and its
multifaceted impact on judicial review of motions to withdraw or to
substitute counsel. One goal of this discussion is to discourage the
direct comparison of judges' resolution of motions to withdraw or to
substitute counsel in civil and in post-conviction criminal cases. Such a
comparison would be inappropriate because of the heavy restraints
the Sixth Amendment places on post-conviction judicial review of
the tribunal's approval of the motion. See People v. Brown, 250 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765 n.3
(Ct. App. 1988) ("Requiring defense counsel to generally continue representing
defendant did not expose counsel to disciplinary or criminal action. He fulfilled his
ethical obligation by bringing the motion to withdraw.").
73. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(d) & cmt. 9. This is consistent with the
lawyer's fiduciary duties to the client, discussed supra notes 41-46 and accompanying
text.
74. This is true in both the context of civil litigation and in the criminal justice
system.
75. See Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., No. 81 Civ. 5224, 1989 WL 88709, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1989) ("The question of attorney withdrawal over a client's
objections is not often litigated and as a result there is little written on the subject.");
At. Petroleum Corp. v. Jackson Oil Co., 572 A.2d 469, 473 (D.C. 1990) ("Courts in
other jurisdictions also have not provided much guidance for determining when an
attorney/client relationship has deteriorated to a point which warrants the trial
judge's decision to grant a motion to withdraw as counsel. Undoubtedly this is
because of the variety of circumstances that may arise."). This poses a significant
challenge to any comprehensive analysis of the judiciary's view of the lawyer-client
relationship and is mentioned here to acknowledge that this Note's presentation of
the themes present in judges' analyses of breakdowns of the lawyer-client
relationship, see infra Parts II.A-B, is based on available material, but is likely only
the tip of the iceberg with respect to these issues.
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motions to withdraw or to substitute counsel in the criminal context. 6
Despite these limitations, however, judges' discussions of the lawyerclient relationship in post-conviction appeals remain relevant, and are
therefore presented in Part II of this Note.
a. Withdrawal During Civil Litigation
Standards applied by judges to evaluate withdrawal motions in the
context of civil litigation are relatively uncomplicated.7 7 The trial
court will weigh the adequacy of the lawyer's proffered justification
for withdrawal against any possible prejudice to the client's rights
resulting from the delay consequent to replacing the lawyer and,
finally, consider whether the trial calendar of the court will be
adversely affected by the delay, thereby hindering justice.7" The
timing of the motion, in particular its proximity to trial, will usually be
a prominent factor in the court's analysis.79 Appellate courts review
these determinations for abuse of discretion,8 0 but generally afford the
trial court wide latitude in making determinations regarding a
lawyer's withdrawal.8 1
b. Withdrawal or Substitution of Counsel Duringa Criminal
Representation
In the context of the criminal justice system, the standards applied
by judges to evaluate both withdrawal and substitution of counsel
motions are, in large part, shaped by the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of legal representation to all criminal defendants, which

"has come to be regarded as the sine qua non of our criminal justice

system."83 The Sixth Amendment requires that an accused be
provided with a lawyer, 4 unless the defendant "'knowingly and
76. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
77. This is particularly apparent when these standards are compared to the
analytical framework, which is used by judges in criminal courts and which must
account for complications raised by the Sixth Amendment. See infra Part I.C.2.b.
78. See Goldsmith v. Pyramid Communications, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 694, 696-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
79. See, e.g., Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the
court is "loath to allow an attorney to withdraw on the eve of trial"). But see Fidelity
Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Intercounty Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 537, 541 (7th
Cir. 2002) (expressing the view that the motion to withdraw made after an extensive
discovery period could reflect the attorney's desire to protect his client's interests by
withdrawing during a "quiet period before trial").
80. E.g., Whiting, 187 F.3d at 320 ("We review a district court's denial of a motion
to withdraw only for abuse of discretion.").
81. See id. ("The trial judge is closest to the parties and the facts, and we are very
reluctant to interfere with district judges' management of their very busy dockets.").
82. U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
83. Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1994).
84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

2005]
intelligently'

A VIEW FROM THE BENCH

2677

waives this right.85 Importantly, the Supreme Court

qualified the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel by holding that

a criminal defendant is not entitled to a "meaningful relationship"

with his defense lawyer.86 Nor does the criminal defendant have "'an

unqualified right to the appointment of counsel of his own
choosing. '1 The Supreme Court, however, does recognize that "'the
88

right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.'

Judges interpret this as implying some substance in the right, and,
accordingly, have held that that effective assistance of counsel
requires more than the lawyer's mere presence in the courtroom.8 9
Exactly how much more involvement by the lawyer is required by the

Sixth Amendment is addressed by judges in their pre- and postconviction reviews of motions to withdraw or to substitute counsel.
Before a verdict is rendered in a criminal case, the trial court retains
broad discretion over whether or not to permit withdrawal or
substitution of counsel. 90 Implicitly though, consideration of whether
85. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)). In practice, this requires judges granting withdrawal or
substitution of counsel motions in a criminal proceeding to appoint replacement
counsel unless the defendant makes a valid waiver of his right to representation. For
a discussion of how this might affect judges' institutional interests when evaluating
the lawyer-client relationship, see infra note 107 and accompanying text.
86. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). Contra id. at 20-21 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("Given the importance of counsel to the presentation of an effective
defense, it should be obvious that a defendant has an interest in his relationship with
his attorney.").
87. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 10 (quoting Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir.

1981)).
88. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court
has also made clear, however, that the goal of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel
"is not to improve the quality of legal representation .... The purpose is simply to
ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
89. See Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution, however, means more than just the
opportunity to be physically accompanied by a person privileged to practice law.").
90. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a substitution of counsel motion where
the defendant's desired lawyer had only a potential conflict of interest). It is
important to note that the trial judge has a duty to inquire into the extent and nature
of the alleged breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship since "in most
circumstances a court can only ascertain the extent of a breakdown in communication
by asking specific and targeted questions." United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268
F.3d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2001). Failure to conduct such an inquiry will constitute an
abuse of discretion. See id. at 777 ("'[A] district court must conduct such necessary
inquiry as might ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern."' (quoting
United States v. Garcia, 924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and
citation omitted))); People v. Marsden, 465 P.2d 44, 47 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (finding
abuse of discretion where the trial court failed to permit the defendant to relate
specific details supporting the alleged inadequate representation and stating that
"[t]he defendant may have knowledge of conduct and events relevant to the diligence
and competence of his attorney which are not apparent to the trial judge from
observations within the four corners of the courtroom.").
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the denial of the motion to withdraw or substitute counsel will result
in the violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights must
inform the judge's decision.9 1

After the criminal defendant's

conviction, however, the inquiry is no longer a discretionary review of
whether the breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship was sufficient
to justify its termination, but only whether the trial court's ruling on
the motion to withdraw or to substitute counsel resulted in a violation
of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.9 z
Consequently, the appellate court's ability to provide relief (reverse a
defendant's conviction) is restricted.9 3 As in the context of civil
litigation,94 the standard for appellate review in the criminal context is
abuse of discretion,95 and judges are generally deferential in their
review.96 The available cases suggest that judges conducting this

inquiry with respect to withdrawal or substitution of counsel motions
examine a combination of four factors in their analysis:
(1) the timeliness of the motion, (2) the adequacy of the court's
inquiry into the matter, (3) the extent of the conflict between the
91. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. It is not accidental that the
threshold for termination is when communication between the defendant and his
lawyer entirely ceases. It is at this point that such a conflict renders the lawyer's
assistance ineffective, thereby implicating the Sixth Amendment. See Frazer, 18 F.3d
at 782 (noting that a constitutionally sufficient representation "contemplates open
communication unencumbered by unnecessary impediments to the exchange of
information and advice").
92. A defendant's assertion of a Sixth Amendment violation is often framed as an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. E.g., Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d at 776 & n.1.
Alternatively, a defendant may assert a Sixth Amendment claim premised on being
denied the counsel of his choice. See United States v. Myers, 294 F.3d 203, 207 (1st
Cir. 2002). For a discussion of the parameters of the Sixth Amendment's guarantees
with respect to legal representation, see supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
93. For example, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must show that his lawyer's poor performance likely affected the outcome
of the representation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (articulating the standard by
which to judge ineffective assistance of counsel claims as "[t]he defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."). Alternatively, a
defendant must show that an actual conflict of interest existed. See Mickens v. Taylor,
535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (interpreting the term "actual conflict of interest" to mean "a
conflict that affected counsel's performance"); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350
(1980) ("In order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a
defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance.").
94. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting that the standard of review
by appellate courts in civil litigation is also abuse of discretion).
95. See Myers, 294 F.3d at 207; United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir.
2001).
96. See Myers, 294 F.3d at 207 ("Deference makes perfect sense, for the trial court
is in the best position to assess the qualitative aspects of the complex relationship
between a defendant and his appointed counsel."). But see Wheat v. United States,
486 U.S. 153, 168 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that a deferential standard
of review is inappropriate where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is implicated).
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attorney and client and whether it was so great that it resulted in a
total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense, and
(4) the balancing of these factors with the public's interest in the
prompt and efficient administration of justice.97
When considering the second factor, appellate courts seem to
employ a range of approaches for evaluating the adequacy of the trial
One approach focuses primarily on the legal
court's inquiry.
competence of the criminal defense lawyer and places less importance
on the quality of the interaction between the lawyer and the
defendant. 9 Another approach, while not explicitly contradicting the
Supreme Court by requiring a "meaningful" lawyer-client

97. Mack, 258 F.3d at 556. While circuits differ with respect to the focus of their
inquiry into the lawyer-client relationship, see infra notes 98-100 and accompanying
text, appellate criminal courts consistently consider these general factors. See Myers,
294 F.3d at 207; United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2002); c.f. United
Stated v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (considering only three factors
"(1) the timeliness of the motion and the extent of resulting inconvenience or delay;
(2) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3)
whether the conflict between the defendant and his attorney was so great that it
resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense" and
omitting any mention of the public's interest). Interestingly, in other areas of criminal
law, judges have relinquished some of their discretion to conduct inquiries into the
lawyer-client relationship. Where a judge must determine whether a criminal
defendant's waiver of a conflict-free representation is knowing and intelligent, the
Second Circuit has promulgated a procedure which relies largely on the defendant's
own lawyer and, in some instances, on an independent lawyer, to advise the
defendant of specific risks of proceeding with representation by a lawyer who may
have a conflict of interest. See United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 890 (2d Cir.
1982). The trial court's role is limited to advising the defendant of his right to a
conflict-free representation and generally instructing the defendant on "problems
inherent in being represented by an attorney with divided loyalties." Id. Then, the
trial court should simply "allow the defendant to confer with his chosen counsel,
encourage the defendant to seek advice from independent counsel, and allow a
reasonable time for the defendant to make his decision." Id. Commentators have
identified this structure as one which is highly protective of the lawyer-client
relationship, since the process of judicial fact-finding may "compromise privileged
communications, undermine the defendant's faith in his attorney, and chill the
attorney's enthusiasm for the case." Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly":
How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 Colum. L.
Rev. 1201, 1232 (1989). Instead "[clourts have appropriately entrusted this inquiry to
defense counsel, rather than undertaking it themselves, since such an inquiry could
inadvertently undermine the very right to counsel it is intended to protect." Id. at
1232-33 (internal citation omitted).
98. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159 (discussing the proper approach to evaluate Sixth
Amendment claims and noting that "'the appropriate inquiry focuses on the
adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such."'
(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984))); see also Myers, 294
F.3d at 207 (rejecting petitioner's claim that lower court's focus on "performance
rather than the deteriorated attorney-client relationship" when evaluating the
lawyer's motion to withdraw was reversible error); Barrow, 287 F.3d at 738
(confirming that the lower court's focus when evaluating the lawyer-client
relationship should be on the "adequacy of counsel in the adversarial process, not the
accused's relationship with his attorney").
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relationship,9 9 suggests that a court should not disregard the
qualitative aspects of the lawyer-client relationship when determining
In addition to these considerations, it has been
its adequacy. 1°
suggested that judges' willingness to grant a motion for withdrawal or
substitution of counsel may hinge on whether or not the defendant is
indigent, and is therefore represented by an appointed lawyer.""
In 1948, Justice Black wrote the following:
Undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service to a client are
prized traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind of service
for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision. And nowhere is
this service deemed more honorable than in case of appointment to
represent an accused too poor to hire a lawyer ....102
Since then, some judges continue to express the view that the lawyerclient relationship between an indigent defendant and his appointed
counsel should be identical to one where the parties are bound by a
fee agreement.1"3 There are, however, judges and commentators who
suggest this is an inaccurate portrayal, in part because where the
lawyer is appointed, there are increased obstacles to the formation of
trust and confidence in the lawyer-client relationship, including a
notoriously crowded, underfunded public defense system, which
permits appointed lawyers little time to cultivate a relationship of
Additionally, appointed
trust and confidence with their clients."
99. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).
100. See United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2001)
(reversing the lower court's denial of the defendant's substitution of counsel motion
where "[t]here was too much emphasis on the appointed counsel's ability to provide
adequate representation and not enough attention to the status and quality of the
attorney-client relationship."); Musa, 220 F.3d at 1102 (rejecting competence as the
sole factor on which to evaluate the adequacy of the lawyer-client relationship);
Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[T]o compel one charged with
[a] grievous crime to undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he
has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of the effective
assistance of any counsel whatsoever."); People v. Wilson, 204 N.W.2d 269, 271
(Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (noting that the trial judge's "conclusion that appointed
counsel was competent was unresponsive to defendant's allegation regarding... the
destruction of communication and confidence between the parties").
101. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
102. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948).
103. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 24 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("'[O]nce counsel is
appointed to represent an indigent defendant, whether it be the public defender or a
volunteer private attorney, the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship which
is no less inviolable than if counsel had been retained."' (quoting Smith v. Superior
Court, 440 P.2d 65, 74 (Cal. 1968))); State ex. rel. Burns v. Erickson, 129 N.W. 2d 712,
716 (S.D. 1964) ("The attorney's obligation and duty to his client is, and must be, the
same whether he is paid much or little or nothing at all. Such is the tenor of the oath
to which he subscribes when admitted to practice."). Consequently, it follows that an
indigent defendant's relationship with his lawyer is entitled to the same protection as
any other defendant. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 22 (Brennan, J., concurring).
104. See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics
Perspective, 52 Emory L.J. 1169, 1178-85 (2003) (noting that inadequate funding of
public defense systems combined with the excessive case loads of appointed lawyers
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lawyers must overcome the historic mistrust of their allegiance and
In this vein, Justice Brennan has
abilities by criminal defendants.'
acknowledged that "we must accept the harsh reality that the quality
of a criminal defendant's representation frequently may turn on his
ability to retain the best counsel money can buy.' ' 10 6 Finally,
commentators have suggested that when the defendant is indigent,
judges are less likely to recognize a complete breakdown of the
lawyer-client relationship that justifies its termination, because where
the defendant is entitled to replacement counsel, the court has an
overwhelming institutional interest in retaining the originally
appointed defense lawyer.0 7
Having described the historical import of trust and confidence in
the lawyer-client relationship, as well as the existing procedural
framework for its termination during civil litigation and criminal

proceedings, this Note now turns to a more speculative task:
determining judges' current views of the lawyer-client relationship.
II. IN THEIR OWN WORDS: THE JUDICIARY'S VIEW OF THE
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

In an effort to ascertain judges' current views of the lawyer-client
relationship, this part considers the judiciary's response to instances of
alleged breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship by exploring
recurrent themes in judicial decisions, from both civil litigation and
the criminal justice system, that address either the withdrawal or the

substitution of counsel. A comparison of judicial opinions from these
two procedural contexts suggests that despite some congruence in

results in systemic neglect of indigent defendants and may provide an incentive for
appointed lawyers to economize by encouraging guilty pleas).
105. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J.,dissenting) ("It is
no secret that indigent clients often mistrust the lawyers appointed to represent
them.").
106. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 23 (Brennan, J., concurring). Another court, finding that
the Sixth Amendment rights of an indigent defendant were violated by the trial
judge's failure to investigate allegations that his appointed lawyer verbally assaulted
him with racial slurs, pointed out the "improbability" of a non-indigent defendant
receiving the same treatment by his retained lawyer. See Frazer v. United States, 18
F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 1994).
107. See Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The
Impact on Competent Representation and Proposalsfor Reform, 29 B.C. L. Rev. 531,
571 (1988) ("Any change of counsel causes delay and keeps the case on the judge's
calendar for a longer period of time. That reality leads trial judges to ignore
defendants' concerns as well as the proper responsibilities of the court."); see also
John, supra note 71, at 160 ("Due process requirements wage a constant battle with
the need to process large numbers of cases."). In contrast, civil litigants are not
entitled to appointed counsel. See Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Intercounty
Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Litigants have no right to free
legal aid in civil suits."). Therefore, the institutional costs of permitting withdrawal or
substitution of counsel during civil litigation are arguably much lower.
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judges' approaches to breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship,"°8
judges in the criminal context seem more likely to reject even a
worthy motion to withdraw or to substitute counsel. The apparent
result of this disparate treatment is that trust and confidence in the
lawyer-client relationship receives less protection in the criminal
justice system than in civil litigation. 9 Why is this the case? The
opinions presented below suggest that judges' skepticism of criminal
defendants"' and of their lawyers,"' combined with an imperfect
procedure by which judges evaluate alleged breakdowns in the
lawyer-client relationship," 2 might be largely responsible. This Note
next introduces judges' approaches to alleged breakdowns in the
lawyer-client relationship during civil litigation, followed by a similar
analysis of cases from the criminal justice system.
A. Approaching the Lawyer-Client Relationship in Civil Litigation
Part II.A examines the judiciary's view of the lawyer-client
relationship within the context of civil litigation, which appears to be
largely consistent with the traditional views of the lawyer-client
relationship held by the bench and the bar." 3 Part II.A.1 begins with
the acknowledgment that when certain circumstances are present,
judges will act to terminate the lawyer-client relationship. Then, Parts
II.A.2 and II.A.3 discuss judges' respect for the lawyer as an
individual entity and the related theme of judges' readiness to permit
a lawyer's withdrawal if they perceive the client to be at fault for the
dysfunction of the lawyer-client relationship. Finally, Part II.A.4
discusses the role that extralegal factors play in judicial assessment of
alleged breakdowns.
1. The Easy Case: Adversarial Lawyer-Client Relationships
Despite the largely idiosyncratic nature of the courts' decisions to
permit withdrawal," 4 the cases suggest that judges concur on the
108. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1 (discussing judges' approaches to adversarial
lawyer-client relationships in civil litigation and in the criminal justice system,
respectively).
109. See infra Part III.A (concluding that the lawyer-client relationship receives
less protection in the criminal justice system than in civil litigation).
110. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
111. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
112. See infra Part III.A; infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text (noting that the
confidential nature of the lawyer-client relationship severely limits the scope of
judicial inquiry into an alleged breakdown).
113. See supra Parts I.A.1-2 (discussing the historical expectations of trust and
confidence in the lawyer-client relationship of both the bench and the bar,
respectively).
114. See Atl. Petroleum Corp. v. Jackson Oil Co., 572 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1990)
(noting that "the decision turns on the trial judge's evaluation of an interpersonal
relationship with nuances that often may fail to be revealed in a trial transcript").
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appropriate response to what is alternatively described as an
"irretrievable breakdown"'' 5 or a "'complete breakdown' 1' 16 of the
lawyer-client relationship in a civil litigation. Judges will grant a
lawyer's motion to withdraw where the lawyer-client relationship is
characterized by unambiguous hostility such that it becomes
adversarial in nature." 7 In Wolgin v. Smith, the client repeatedly
"attacked [the lawyer's] character and professional ethics"' in a
letters in which he compared the lawyer to a
series of ' threatening
"reptile"" 9 and complained of being "shaken down" by the law
firm. 2' Additionally, the lawyer-client relationship was so severely
strained that the parties could communicate in court only by writing
notes to each other. 2 ' Faced with these facts, the judge permitted the
lawyer's withdrawal.'22
The primary consideration driving this

analysis was the court's conventional understanding of a wellfunctioning lawyer-client relationship.'23
Given the mutual
antagonism of this relationship, the court recognized that the
traditional elements of trust and confidence in the lawyer-client
relationship were unattainable.'24 The judge also expressed concern
regarding the possible negative effect of a dysfunctional lawyer-client

relationship on the court's administration of justice. 25 These factors
remain prevalent in judges' evaluations of the lawyer-client
relationship; however, where the breakdown is less obvious, judges
will also consider issues other than the role of trust and confidence
within the lawyer-client relationship, such as protecting the lawyer's
individual freedom to contract.
115. Wolgin v. Smith, No. CIV.A.94-7471, 1996 WL 482943, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
21, 1996).
116. Ad. Petroleum Corp., 572 A.2d at 473 (quoting Blessing v. Dow Chemical Co.,
521 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Me. 1987)).
117. Wolgin, 1996 WL 482943, at *3-4; see also In re Dunn, 98 N.E. 914, 915 (N.Y.
1912) (recognizing certain instances where it is "desirable to permit a termination of
the relation rather than to attempt to coerce its continuance under adverse
conditions"). The same trigger for termination exists in criminal matters. See infra
note 165 and accompanying text.
118. Wolgin, 1996 WL 482943, at *3.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *4.
122. Id. at *5.
123. See id. at *4 (noting that mutual confidence between a lawyer and a client is
critical for a successful representation and that "'[s]hotgun weddings and enforced
lawyer-client relationships fall into the same category"' (citation omitted)). For a
detailed discussion of the judiciary's conventional view of the lawyer-client
relationship see supra Part I.A.1.
124. See Wolgin, 1996 WL 482943, at *4 ("Mutual disrespect, disregard, and
distrust are not the foundation of an effective attorney-client relationship."). The
same concern similarly prompts termination of the lawyer-client relationship in
criminal proceedings. See infra text accompanying notes 171-72.
125. See Wolgin, 1996 WL 482943, at *4 ("[Tlhe Court is concerned that forcing
[the lawyer] to continue to represent [the client] under circumstances such as these
will interfere with the Court's ability to effectively adjudicate this case.").
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2. The Contractual View
The reciprocal nature of the lawyer-client relationship is often
understood by judges, at its most fundamental level, as a type of
has historically been understood as a
contract. 126 This 2 contract
"unique contract,"" 7 in part because of the unusually central role trust
and confidence play in its execution. 128 The lawyer-client contract also
stands alone because it is governed by marked exceptions to
traditional contract law,12 9 including the lawyer's inability to terminate
the lawyer-client relationship during litigation without judicial
approval. 3 0 In keeping with this distinction between "ordinary
and the contract that forms the lawyer-client
contracts"''
relationship, courts apply an amended version of classical contract
theory to their analyses of the lawyer-client relationship. 3 2 One
example of this approach is judges' use of the equitable doctrine of
specific performance.'33 Even when a client objects to a lawyer's
126. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14(1)(a)-(b) (2000)
(requiring manifestations of consent from both the lawyer and the client to form a
lawyer-client relationship); see also Goldsmith v. Pyramid Communications, Inc., 362
F. Supp. 694, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (referring to the agreement between a lawyer and
client as a "contract"); Rindner v. Cannon Mills, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859 (Sup. Ct.
1985) (referring to the agreement between lawyer and client as a "contract"). This
characterization is less applicable in the criminal context where lawyers are often
appointed by the court to provide representation thereby eliminating the element of
mutual consent. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14(2).
127. Battani, Ltd. v. Bar-Car, Ltd., 299 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
128. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
129. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts Is Different, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 443, 445 (1998) ("As a result of lawyers' special role in the legal
system, contracts between lawyer and client receive different treatment than other
contracts.").
130. See Battani, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 631 (discussing the requirement that a lawyer
obtain tribunal approval to terminate the lawyer-client relationship and stating that
"[i]t may seem anomalous that a prospective breacher should ask the court's
permission to breach. There is no anomaly. This is merely another aspect of the
uniqueness of the attorney-client contract." (internal punctuation omitted)). The
Model Rules also articulate the requirement of tribunal approval for termination of
the lawyer-client relationship. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
131. In re Dunn, 98 N.E. 914, 916 (N.Y. 1912).
132. See Perillo, supra note 129, at 445. This article explores the variety of ways in
which lawyers' contracts are distinguished for special, often preferential, treatment by
the bench and discusses the numerous ways in which lawyers' contracts are subject to
exceptions to classical contract law. Id. Professor Joseph M. Perillo discusses several
exceptions, which are relevant to the scope of this Note. These include the client's
unilateral right to terminate the lawyer-client relationship, despite the presence of a
retainer agreement, id. at 446-47, and the lawyer's ability to withdraw from a (nonlitigous) representation if the withdrawal will not have a "'material adverse effect on
the interests of the client,"' id. at 449 (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers §44(3)(a) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
133. Specific performance is defined as follows:
The rendering, as nearly as practicable, of a promised performance through
a judgment or decree; specif., a court-ordered remedy that requires precise
fulfillment of a legal or contractual obligation when monetary damages are
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withdrawal, judges are hesitant to require specific performance by the
attorney,'14 and will do so only where the client's rights, or the court's
calendar are unduly prejudiced by the delay resulting from
Judges' recognition of lawyers' independent
withdrawal. 3 5
professional interests'3 6 is echoed by their actions to protect the
lawyers' financial interests in a representation. Courts have agreed
that, in certain circumstances, appropriate grounds to terminate the
lawyer-client relationship exist where "the representation will result
'
This
in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer." 137

recognition of the lawyer as an independent actor, one with separate

professional and financial interests than those of his client,'3 8 is further

reinforced by judges' responses to instances of client misconduct that
strain the lawyer-client relationship.
3. The Blame Inquiry: Rewarding Client Misconduct
In civil litigation, where the lawyer-client relationship deteriorates
completely, courts often look to assign blame to either the lawyer or

inappropriate or inadequate, as when the sale of real estate or a rare article
is involved.
Black's Law Dictionary 1435 (8th ed. 2004); see Rindner v. Cannon Mills, Inc., 486
N.Y.S.2d 858, 859 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("Denying an attorney's application [to withdraw]
amounts to enforcing specific performance of the attorney-client relationship.");
Battani, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 631 (denying a motion to withdraw "runs afoul of the old rule
that a court will not order specific performance of a contract for personal services").
134. Lawyers seeking permission to withdraw receive markedly different treatment
in the criminal justice system. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
135. See Goldsmith v. Pyramid Communications, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). The court held:
What amounts to specific performance by an attorney has been required,
but such cases are extremely rare. They fall into two general classifications,
that is, situations where the client's rights will be prejudiced by the delay
consequent on replacing counsel and cases where the trial calendar of the
Court will be dislocated, so as to impede the interests of justice.
Id. at 696 (internal citations omitted).
136. The courts' hesitancy to require specific performance of a lawyer should not
be interpreted as recognition of a lawyer's property right in the lawyer-client contract.
As evidenced by the fact that a client may terminate the lawyer-client relationship at
will, the lawyer has no expectancy or property interest in the representation. See
Perillo, supra note 129, at 446 ("If the client elects to fire the lawyer without cause,
the lawyer is entitled to recover in quantum meruit, but, subject to a few exceptions,
she has no right to expectancy damages.").
137. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(b)(6) (1983) (amended 2003); see also
Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Intercounty Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 537,
540 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing the district court's denial of a withdrawal motion where
there was "$470,000 in unpaid bills, with the meter still running and poor prospects of
future payment" and declaring that "lawyers are entitled to stop working when clients
stop paying"); Jill Schachner Chanen, Unpaid Legal Bills Grounds for Withdrawal,
Corp. Legal Times, Feb. 2003, at 58.
138. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
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the client for its failure. 139 Judges do so in the context of analyzing
whether or not the lawyer had "good cause" to withdraw. 4 ° If the

client is to blame for the breakdown, judges will regularly permit the
lawyer to withdraw from the representation.'

Some judges have

explained their willingness to permit withdrawal in these instances by
analogizing the client's misconduct to an implicit discharge of his
lawyer. 4 2 In Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co., the judge identified the
client's persistent refusal to follow certain legal procedures and his

"irrational rejection

'1
43

of a reasonable settlement offer as factors that

precipitated the breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship. 1" After

finding that "it was [the client's] unwillingness to cooperate with his
attorneys which caused the problems," the judge permitted the
Additionally, where the client's misconduct is
lawyers to withdraw.'

extreme, courts may view withdrawal as necessary to protect the
lawyer's professional reputation.

One judge permitted a lawyer's

withdrawal where the client's misconduct created a "functional
139. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co., 237 N.W.2d 520, 523-24 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1975) (analyzing at length which party bore responsibility for the breakdown of
the lawyer-client relationship).
140. See id. at 522 (discussing the role of good cause in terminating a lawyer-client
relationship and finding "[i]t is clear that 'good cause' exists when the client has
caused a total breakdown in the attorney-client relationship"). Notably, there are
numerous grounds, not directly related to the lawyer-client relationship, which may
constitute "good cause" for a lawyer to withdraw from civil litigation. These include
where the lawyer is unable to perform her duties because of the unwelcome
interference of co-counsel. See Joseph Brenner Assocs. Inc. v. Starmaker Entm't, Inc.,
82 F.3d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1996) (permitting the lawyer to withdraw where she perceived
co-counsel as a "'back-seat driver"'). Another ground is where the lawyer concludes
the client's action is without merit. See Rindner v. Cannon Mills, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d
858, 860 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (finding good cause for withdrawal where the lawyer no
longer felt the client's action was meritorious and where there was no indication of
bad faith). A third ground is where the client fails to pay legal fees. See Fidelity Nat'l
Title Ins. Co. of N.Y., 310 F.3d at 541 (permitting withdrawal where the client had
failed to pay almost $500,000 in legal bills before the start of trial).
141. See Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 1999) (permitting withdrawal
where the client's "desire both to dictate legal strategies to his counsel and to sue
counsel if those strategies are not followed" placed the lawyer in an "impossible"
situation); Ambrose, 237 N.W.2d at 524 (permitting withdrawal where the client
refused to follow certain legal procedures and inexplicably rejected a favorable
settlement offer). This is not to say, of course, that any instance of client misconduct
will result in the termination of the representation. Courts do distinguish between
those clients who are difficult and those whose behavior crosses the line to
unreasonably difficult. See Atl. Petroleum Corp. v. Jackson Oil Co., 572 A.2d 469, 474
(D.C. 1990) ("That counsel had a difficult client is not the same as having a client who
does not communicate at all."). For a discussion of how judges' blame inquiries differ
in the context of the criminal justice system, see infra Part II.B.3.
142. Ambrose, 237 N.W.2d at 522 ("'[I]t must be held that such conduct is
equivalent to a discharge of his counsel, and a breaking off of the confidential and
delicate relation theretofore existing between them."' (quoting Genrow v. Flynn, 131
N.W. 1115, 1116 (Mich. 1911))).
143. Id. at 523.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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conflict of interest" since it would inevitably lead to the lawyer's
choosing between facing a frivolous malpractice action or Rule 11
sanctions. 4 6 Of course, assigning blame for the breakdown of the

lawyer-client relationship is frequently not as straightforward as the
above examples illustrate. In many instances, the courts' analyses are
further complicated by extralegal factors.
4. Consideration of Extralegal Factors

Even where judges recognize a breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship, they may still elect, on a discretionary basis, to deny a
lawyer's motion to withdraw. 47 There are numerous reasons why

judges may choose this course; among them is the judiciary's desire to

protect third-party interests'4 8 and to promote the interests of
fundamental justice. 49 Also, considerations of judicial economy may

weigh heavily in the court's evaluation of whether or not there are
sufficient grounds to terminate the lawyer-client relationship. 5 '
a. Justice: Generally and for Third Parties
Where the lawyer's withdrawal will unfairly prejudice a third
party's interests in the civil litigation, judges seem likely to deny the

motion. 5 ' This concern with preventing injustice to third parties is
related to a broader theme present in these analyses, that of

promoting justice generally.'52 While judges have denied lawyers'

146. Whiting, 187 F.3d at 323. The court also noted that while the malpractice
action would certainly be unfounded, "it would be actively pursued, and even
frivolous malpractice claims can have substantial collateral consequences." Id.
147. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(c) (1983) (amended 2003) ("A lawyer
must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when
terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the
representation.").
148. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
150. See infra Part II.A.4.b.
151. See Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Intercounty Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 310
F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing "[s]evere prejudice to third parties" as an
appropriate ground on which to deny a lawyer's motion to withdraw). Judge Frank
H. Easterbrook further explained that "[t]his is not because [the lawyer] owes any
obligation to protect the interests of [his client's] adversaries; it is again a matter of
timing, and a judge may insist that counsel resolve differences with clients in a fashion
that curtails strangers' avoidable losses." Id. Judge Easterbrook went on to balance
the interests of the third parties with those of the lawyer and to permit the lawyer's
withdrawal. Id.
152. See Atl. Petroleum Corp. v. Jackson Oil Co., 572 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1990)
(noting "the rules are designed to promote rather than frustrate the interests of
fundamental justice"); see also Wolgin v. Smith, No. CIV.A.94-7471, 1996 WL 482943,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996) ("Justice will not be served in this contested litigation
by forcing the continuation of a lawyer/client relationship characterized by hostility
and acrimony.").
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motions for withdrawal to promote "the interests of fundamental
justice," '5 3 such a denial appears more likely to occur where unusual
15 4
factual circumstances or complex procedural history also exist.
Conversely, judges have also invoked "the interests of fundamental
justice"' 55 as a basis to permit withdrawal, but again, such permission
seems to be granted where unusual circumstances complicate the

analysis. 156
b. JudicialEconomy
Another factor that may trigger a judge's denial of a lawyer's
motion to withdraw from civil litigation, even where the lawyer-client
relationship is obviously damaged, is the judiciary's persistent interest
in promoting judicial economy. 15 7 In one case, a judge refused to
allow plaintiff's lawyers to withdraw from an eight-year-old case
because of the resulting inevitable delay to the proceedings, despite
being "mindful of the fact that the working relationship between
'
Conversely,
counsel and its client is, at the current time, not ideal."158
despite
where,
are
instances
some judges also recognize that there
to
preserve
is
necessary
withdrawal
disruption to the court's calendar,
the integrity of the proceedings.159 The consideration of judicial
economy, 60 as well as many of the other themes discussed above
153. See Atl. Petroleum Corp., 572 A.2d at 472.
154. See id. at 474-75 (reversing the trial judge's grant of the plaintiff's lawyer's
withdrawal motion where the plaintiff's failure to follow the court's instructions and
arrive on time to trial preparation meetings did not constitute misconduct sufficient to
justify withdrawal and where, due to a prior court ruling, the inevitable result of the
lawyer's withdrawal was the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit).
155. See id. at 472.
156. See Esteves v. Esteves, 680 A.2d 398, 404-05 (D.C. 1996) (upholding trial
court's grant of withdrawal motion in post-matrimonial action where the wife's lawyer
had given his client over one month's notice of his intention to withdraw, where the
wife had taken no action to obtain substitute counsel, and where the husband's
interest in obtaining "fundamental justice" would have been thwarted by a
continuance).
157. See Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the "interest of
the district court in preventing counsel from withdrawing on the eve of trial is
substantial"); Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., No. 81 Civ. 5224, 1989 WL 88709, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1989) (denying plaintiff's lawyer's withdrawal motion for reasons
of judicial economy); see also Law Firm's Withdrawal Motion Denied as Not
Promoting 'JudicialEconomy,' N.Y. L.J., Oct. 30, 2003, at 20.
158. See Malarkey, 1989 WL 88709, at *3.The court stated:
It is clear that in this action where there has been extensive motion practice
and the case is, after significant delay, on the verge of trial readiness, a
change in counsel would do no more than extend the already protracted
history of the litigation.... [T]he Court's ability to manage its docket would
certainly be impeded by a change in counsel at this late stage of the
litigation.
Id. at *2.
159. Whiting, 187 F.3d at 321.
160. See infra Part II.B.4.b.
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remain prevalent when considering the lawyer-client relationship in
the context of the criminal justice system.
B. Approaching the Lawyer-Client Relationship in the Criminal
Justice System
Part II.B addresses the judiciary's view of the lawyer-client

relationship within the context of the criminal justice system, which
often reflects a departure not only from the traditional expectations of
the bar and the bench with respect to preserving trust and confidence

in the lawyer-client relationship,1 6 a but also from the approach taken
by judges in civil litigation.1 62 Part II.B.1 recognizes that when
presented with a lawyer-client relationship that is obviously
adversarial in nature, judges will intervene to terminate the
relationship. Then, Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3 discuss the overarching
skepticism of the bench, and judges' related aversion to permitting
withdrawal or substitution of counsel, particularly when the
defendant's misconduct is the source of the lawyer-client
relationship's failure. Finally, Part II.B.4 considers the extralegal

factors that may overwhelm courts' analysis.
1. Another Easy Case: Adversarial Lawyer-Client Relationships

Since courts have interpreted the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of
legal

representation163 as

requiring

advocacy,

not

merely

an

appearance,1 4 it is perhaps not surprising that where the lawyer-client
relationship is undermined such that the lawyer becomes the client's
adversary, judges will recognize a complete breakdown in the lawyerclient relationship and terminate the representation.1 65 In United
161. See supra Parts I.A.1-2 (discussing the historical expectations of trust and
confidence in the lawyer-client relationship of both the bench and the bar,
respectively).
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
164. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("To satisfy
the Constitution, counsel must function as an advocate for the defendant ....).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding that the lawyer's "adversary and antagonistic stance" to his client resulted in
the defendant's being "effectively unrepresented"). Courts have recognized though
that "[i]t is not necessary that every instance of alleged disagreement between...
counsel and an accused requires a substitution of counsel." United States v. Williams,
594 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979). Judges consistently distinguish between instances
where the lawyer and defendant have taken positions adversarial to one another and
other, lesser instances of conflict. For example, a mere "lack of rapport" between the
lawyer and the defendant does not constitute a total breakdown of the lawyer-client
relationship. See State v. Johnsen, No. 23856-0-11, 2000 WL 48516, at *2 (Wash. Ct.
App. Jan. 21, 2000) (finding no breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship where the
record merely showed "a lack of rapport"); State v. Sherrill, No. 19825-8-11, 1998 WL
97224, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1998) (noting that while a complete breakdown
in communication between the lawyer and the client is sufficient to justify a
substitution of appointed counsel, a mere disagreement or dislike of one another is
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States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, the defendant alleged that his appointed
lawyer had used bad language, and threatened to testify against him

and to "sink [him] for 105 years so that [he] wouldn't be able to see

[his] wife and children.' 16 6 The appellate court found that167the
of
appointed lawyer had "virtually abandoned his representation,

the defendant by openly opposing the defendant's numerous motions
to substitute counsel, calling the defendant a liar in open court, and
suggesting to the district judge that the defendant was "feigning

ignorance" with regard to his understanding of the criminal
proceedings. 168 Given these facts, the appellate court found that the
district judge's denial of the defendant's motions to substitute counsel
was an abuse of discretion. 169 While the lawyer-client relationship in

this case may seem unusually strained, there are other, similar
instances of appellate intervention where the lawyer takes a position

adverse to his client.17 ° Judges may provide relief in these cases for a

variety of reasons, some of which may have little to do with the actual

parties to the litigation,'7 1 including their recognition that this type of
insufficient). Also, where the disagreement relates to trial strategy, judges will not
find a breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship. See United States v. Farrah, 128 F.
Supp. 2d 103, 115 (D. Conn. 2001) (finding the lawyer-client relationship intact where
lawyer and client bitterly disagreed over legal strategy). Similarly, judges will
terminate an openly adversarial lawyer-client relationship in civil litigation. See supra
Part II.A.1.
166. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d at 778.
167. Id. at 779.
168. Id. at 778. The court went on to describe the lawyer-client relationship as
"antagonistic, lacking in trust, and quarrelsome." Id. at 780.
169. Id. at 773-74. The court stated that "the district court.., failed to recognize a
material breakdown in trust and communication between defendant and his courtappointed attorney." Id. at 773.
170. See Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding abuse
of discretion where the district court denied defendant's request for relief without
holding an evidentiary hearing regarding defendant's allegations that his appointed
lawyer had verbally assaulted him with racial slurs and threatened to provide inferior
representation if he elected to go to trial); United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500,
1506 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding abuse of discretion where the defendant's lawyer acted
as an "adverse 'witness"' during a substitution of counsel hearing and the district
court then denied the defendant's motion (citation omitted)); United States v.
Williams, 594 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding error where the court denied
defendant's motion to substitute counsel where the "course of the client-attorney
relationship had been a stormy one with quarrels, bad language, threats and counterthreats"); cf. State v. Chambers, No. 50179-8-1, 2003 WL 23019947, at *5 (Wash. Ct.
App. Dec. 29, 2003) (rejecting the claim that the lower court's denial of a substitution
of counsel motion was an abuse of discretion by stating that since the lawyer
advocated for substitution on his client's behalf "the proceeding never became
adversarial, [so] it did not deny [the defendant's] right to representation").
171. See Frazer, 18 F.3d at 785 (citing the United States' national policy against
racial discrimination as support for finding that the lawyer-client relationship was
fatally undermined by the possibility that the appointed lawyer verbally assaulted the
defendant with racial slurs and discussing the disparity in treatment of defendants by
retained and appointed lawyers as a factor in the analysis); Williams, 594 F.2d at 1260
(noting defendant's pro se representation after the district court denied his
substitution of counsel motions was a "disaster").
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antagonistic behavior fatally undermines the traditional goals and

purposes of the lawyer-client relationship.12 Of course, it is not
always the case that judges respond sympathetically to allegations of
breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship. As the next part
explains, often the exact opposite is true.
2. The Skeptical View
Judges often display marked skepticism when evaluating the

veracity of allegations of breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship.
While the majority of this skepticism is aimed at criminal defendants'
motivations for requesting substitution of counsel,'73 criminal defense
lawyers are not immune from judges' distrust and also face skepticism
from the bench.'74 Finally, judges appear skeptical of the system itself,
expressing doubt that termination of the lawyer-client relationship
will effectively resolve conflicts inherent in criminal defense
representation.'75
a. JudicialSkepticism of CriminalDefendants
Judges often appear wary of the motivations of a criminal
defendant who alleges breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship, a

response that reflects both procedural and substantive considerations
of the bench. With regard to procedure, one possible reason for this
guarded response is judges' concerns about being duped by a
defendant's manipulative efforts to delay his trial.'76 Another possible
reason is a more general concern that, if given the opportunity, the
Judges
defendant will somehow abuse the judicial process.177

172. Frazer, 18 F.3d at 785 ("Such behavior completely destroys and negates the
channels of open communication needed for the [lawyer-client] relationship to
function as contemplated in the Constitution.").
173. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
174. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
175. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
176. See United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing the
court's responsibility to "'thwart abusive delay tactics' when evaluating a motion to
substitute counsel (quoting Hunter v. Delo, 62 F.3d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1995))); see also
United States v. Farrah, 128 F. Supp. 2d 103, 115 (D. Conn. 2001) (warning that too
much power in the hands of particularly difficult defendants would effectively halt the
judicial process); People v. Marsden, 465 P.2d 44, 47 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (noting
that the trial court's refusal to consider the defendant's allegation of a breakdown of
the lawyer-client relationship was based on a fear that doing so would set a precedent
making completion of a trial impossible); State v. Hill, No. 20028, 2004 WL 870439, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2004) (finding that the timing of defendant's request to
substitute counsel supported the conclusion that it "was made in bad faith and for
purposes of delay"). But see United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1510 (9th
Cir. 1987) (condemning the trial judge's assumption that defendant's motion was
made for the purposes of delaying the trial as "unreasonable").
177. See People v. Kirvin, No. B156887, 2003 WL 21227993, at *7 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. May 28, 2003) (quoting the trial judge's response to defendant's numerous
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sometimes explain this skepticism by pointing to the public's and the
judicial system's interest in maintaining an orderly and efficient trial
process,178 and the ensuing need for the judiciary
to balance these
179
interests with the interests of the defendant.
A substantive aspect of judicial skepticism appears to be rooted in
judges' assumptions that defendants' complaints about the quality of
the lawyer-client relationship are merely symptoms of a larger issue:
despondency at being the subject of a criminal prosecution. 8 ° This
view is succinctly illustrated by one trial judge's statement that
"[o]bviously [the defendant's] not happy. He's in a bad situation, it's
not surprising he's not happy.... "181 In this same vein, judges also
suggest that defendants may claim the lawyer-client relationship has
broken down when their real dissatisfaction lies with their lawyers'
truthful assessments of their situations. 8 2 In these instances, judges

requests to change counsel as, "'I think you are manipulating the system."' (citation
omitted)); see also United States v. Ramey, 559 F. Supp. 60, 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1981)
(discussing defendant's motion to substitute his retained lawyer and noting that "[t]he
right of [the defendant] to counsel of his choice... 'cannot be used merely as a
manipulative monkey wrench"' (quoting Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th
Cir. 1978))); People v. Earp, No. F041724, 2003 WL 22368871, at *6 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003) (expressing the view that defendant's claim of breakdown in
the lawyer-client relationship was "an excuse for noncooperation" and an attempt at
manipulation).
178. See Ramey,559 F. Supp. at 63; People v. Brown, 250 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765 (Ct.
App. 1988).
179. See Barrow, 287 F.3d at 738 (discussing the need for balancing analysis);
Ramey,559 F. Supp. at 63 (discussing need for balance).
180. See State v. Johnsen, No. 23856-0-Il, 2000 WL 48516, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App.
Jan. 21, 2000).
181. Johnsen, 2000 WL 48516, at *1; accord Kirvin, 2003 WL 21227993, at *3
(quoting trial judge's response to defendant's claim of breakdown of the lawyer-client
relationship as "'I'm just hearing that he's frightened. He's nervous. He doesn't
understand everything that's going on.... [N]o defendant ever does know everything
that's going on."').
182. See People v. Cortes, No. B167341, 2004 WL 1799749, at *11 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2004) ("Appellant was angry because of disrespectful statements
made to him by counsel. However... counsel's statement to appellant about the
possibility of a gun charge appears to be counsel's frank assessment of the
situation ....). The Kirvin court quoted the trial judge's explanation of the source
of conflict in a lawyer-client relationship as follows:
[D]efendants get frustrated and angry at their defense counsel because their
defense counsel is urging them to consider the risks of rejecting the offer by
the People, and they don't like it. But that does not mean that defense
counsel is not doing an adequate job of representing you. It's just they're
delivering [a very] unpleasant message. But that he has to do.
Kirvin, 2003 WL 21227993, at *5 (second alteration in original); see also United States
v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting the trial court's
response to defendant as "'[b]ecause of the delay in accepting [the lower charge], the
charges are now higher, and that causes you to believe somehow that [the appointed
counsel] is responsible for that, when simply he's just giving you the sad news that the
prosecutor has raised the stakes."' (third alteration in original) (citation omitted));
Earp, 2003 WL 22368871, at *6 (commenting that a conflict between lawyer and client
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may recognize that a legitimate disagreement exists, but not one that
rises to the level of a complete breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship. 8 3 Interestingly, judicial skepticism of assertions that the
lawyer-client relationship has broken down is not limited to those
instances where defendants raise claims to the court, but is also
evident where lawyers request relief."8
b. JudicialSkepticism of Defense Lawyers
Cases suggest that a defense lawyer seeking permission to withdraw
because the lawyer-client relationship has broken down will likely
encounter a judge unwilling to accept his claim at face value.' 85 This
skepticism is partially because judges suspect that defense counsel
may make the claim for tactical reasons. s 6 At least one judge has also
expressed concern that lawyers may improperly use withdrawal
motions to secure a more desirable caseload.187 For these reasons,
judges may be reluctant to relieve a defense lawyer where they are
unable to obtain specific details of the breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship,8l 8 a situation further complicated by the restraints placed
is "not uncommon whenever an attorney is required in a lawsuit to communicate with
a client untrained in the complexities and technicalities of the law").
183. See Johnsen, 2000 WL 48516, at *2 (acknowledging that lawyer and client did
not get along and affirming the trial court's denial of withdrawal motion); see also
Barrow, 287 F.3d at 738 (noting "'the reality that a person accused of a crime is often
genuinely unhappy with an appointed counsel who is nonetheless doing a good job"'
(quoting Hunter,62 F.3d at 274)).
184. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
185. See Earp, 2003 WL 22368871, at *5 (noting with regard to the existence of a
breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship that "[c]ounsel saying so did not make it
so"); see also United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2001) (refusing to find
abuse of discretion where the trial court denied the lawyer's motion to withdraw after
the lawyer suggested that a breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship had occurred
but defendant did not express dissatisfaction); Aceves v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr.
2d 280, 284 (Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting the proposition that "the trial court must accept
a sweeping claim of conflict and 'rubber stamp' counsel's request to withdraw"). But
see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978) (finding it persuasive justification
for separate counsel in a conflict of interest case that "attorneys are officers of the
court, and 'when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court,
their declarations are virtually made under oath."' (quoting State v. Brazile, 75 So. 2d
856, 861 (La. 1954))). Generally, judges seem to display less skepticism when
assessing a lawyer's claims in civil litigation. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying
text.
186. See People v. Anderson, No. A099051, 2003 WL 22093909, at *11 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2003) (noting the withdrawal motion "appeared to be
merely an attempt to circumvent the trial court's earlier refusal to appoint substitute
counsel").
187. See Earp, 2003 WL 22368871, at *6 ("The trial court is not bound to accept the
appraisal of a defense counsel who may be only too happy to get out from under a
difficult representation.").
188. See Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1998). The
trial judge found that defense counsel's refusal to provide any disclosure regarding
the basis of the asserted conflict, combined with a history of delay tactics, justified
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on lawyers by their duty to maintain client confidentiality. 9
Additionally, at least one commentator has suggested that judicial
mistrust of defense lawyers is particularly pronounced when the
lawyer in question is a public defender.19 ° Finally, the cases suggest
that much of the judges' skepticism results from their views that a
change in counsel is an inadequate remedy to truly settle the
underlying conflict between the lawyer and the client.
c. Judicial Skepticism of the Remedy

The language of judicial opinions suggests a practical resignation to
the idea that conflict in the relationship between a criminal defendant
and his defense lawyer is, to a certain extent, inevitable.191 Judges
attribute this to a number of factors, including the defendant's
understandable objection to being prosecuted,192 the fact that
fundamental disagreements regarding trial strategy may exist between
a defendant and his lawyer,'93 and the defendant's inability to work
with other people.'94 Where these factors are present, judges are less
likely to replace the lawyer because they assume that notwithstanding
denying the motion to withdraw. Id. at 496-97. The appellate court affirmed, noting
with approval that the "[r]espondent court viewed with a jaundiced eye counsel's
portrayal of his ethical dilemma." Id. at 499; cf. Aceves, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284
(approving defense counsel's motion to withdraw despite only receiving limited
disclosure as to the basis of the conflict because "[w]here as here the duty not to
reveal confidences prevented counsel from further disclosure and the court accepted
the good faith of counsel's representations, the court should find the conflict
sufficiently established and permit withdrawal").
189. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 (1983) (amended 2003).
190. John, supra note 71, at 162-63 (suggesting the judicial system is stacked against
public defenders, noting a "mistrust of appointed counsel" and that "judges often
accommodate the private bar's requests, but rarely extend the same courtesies to
defenders"). One student commentator examines withdrawal from representation as
a public defender and concludes that, for reasons of policy (the desire to promote
efficiency), economics, and judicial prejudice, the rules for withdrawal, while "facially
neutral," are applied inequitably, resulting in "public defenders more often than not
[being] forced to remain on cases while private attorneys are excused." Id. at 168.
This student commentator suggests that this disparity in application lowers the morale
of both public defenders and indigent defendants, thereby undermining the justice
system as a whole. Id. at 165-69.
191. One trial judge hinted at this systemic frustration when he remarked, "We just
don't have the capability in this county to have perfect client communications."
People v. Kirvin, No. B156887, 2003 WL 21227993, at *3 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
May 28, 2003).
192. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
193. See People v. Welch, 976 P.2d 754, 771 (Cal. 1999) ("'At the heart of the
conflict was a fundamental disagreement as to the defense to be presented."' (quoting
defendant's appellate brief)); State v. Chambers, No. 50179-8-I, 2003 WL 23019947, at
*2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2003).
194. See People v. Willis, Nos. D040076, D040219, 2003 WL 22853767, at *3 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2003) (noting "the communication difficulties [the
defendant] had working with his attorney were due to [the defendant's] difficulty in
working with people").
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judicial action, these problems will carry over into any subsequent
representation.19 5 This reticence is also present where judges find that
a defendant's conduct is the source of the breakdown in the lawyerclient relationship.
3. The Blame Inquiry: Punishing Defendant Misconduct
Where a lawyer requests permission to withdraw or a criminal
defendant requests permission to substitute counsel, judges seem
reluctant to grant these motions if the breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship may be attributed to the defendant's refusal to cooperate
with his lawyer.1 96 In one such instance, the trial court admonished
the defendant by saying the following:
[Y]ou may not like [your counsel] right now, and you may be mad at
him and you may decide, what my mother used to say, [to] cut off
your nose to spite your face.., but what you are doing by doing that
is destroying the chance you do have .... I'm convinced from
everything that he's said that he's able to work with you, and it's
you, that you have elected not to take his advice and to not discuss
things with him.' 97

The trial judge went on to deny the defendant's motion to substitute
counsel,198 which was later affirmed since the record reflected that,
"the breakdown in the attorney/client relationship was obviously [the
defendant's] own fault."' 199 This analysis is repeated in many cases,2 °°
suggesting that judges often view the breakdown of the lawyer-client

195. See id. (noting "it was likely [the defendant] would have problems with
whomever was appointed to represent him"); see also People v. Anderson, No. A
099051, 2003 WL 22093909, at *6 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2003) (denying
lawyer's request for appointment of substitute counsel since, given the facts of the
case, the new lawyer would experience the same ethical dilemma as the current
defense counsel); Chambers, 2003 WL 23019947, at *3 (finding "any substituted
counsel would be in the same position as the [current defense counsel] with respect to
veracity issues").
196. E.g., People v. Cumbus, 371 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that "[d]efendant was not entitled to a substitution of counsel because the breakdown
in his relationship was caused by defendant's admitted refusal to cooperate with his
attorney"). For a discussion of how this differs in the context of civil litigation, see
supra note 141 and accompanying text.
197. State v. Irvine, 547 N.W.2d 177, 180-81 (S.D. 1996) (second and third
alterations in original).
198. Id. It is worth noting here that the defense lawyer in this case joined in his
client's motion to substitute counsel and concurred that there had been "'a complete
breakdown"' in the lawyer-client relationship. Id. at 179.
199. Id. at 182.
200. See United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2002); People v. Earp,
No. F041724, 2003 WL 22368871, at *6 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003);
Cumbus, 371 N.W.2d at 496; State v. Sherrill, No. 19825-8-11, 1998 WL 97224, at *2
(Wash. App. Div. 2 Mar. 6, 1988).
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relationship as a consequence of the defendant's choosing. 2°' Where
judges believe that the defendant has intentionally caused the

breakdown, they will deny a motion to withdraw or to substitute
counsel,2 0 2 in part because they view the conflict as one that has the
potential for resolution.2 3 Additionally, there are factors peripheral
to the lawyer-client relationship that may influence the judge's
analysis.
4. Consideration of Extralegal Factors
If evaluating claims of breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship

only required judges to examine the personal

and working

relationship between a criminal defendant and his lawyer, it is
possible that the judiciary would breathe a collective sigh of relief.
The reality, however, is that judges assessing the quality of the lawyer-

client relationship must balance numerous extraneous factors. 204
These include matters of economic policy20 5 and concerns of achieving

judicial economy.20 6

201. See Sherrill, 1998 WL 97224, at *2. The appellate court quoted the trial court
as stating the following:
[T]he Court finds that the defendant's unhappiness with the counselors
appointed to represent him has strained the attorney client relationship.
However, the Court finds that the defendant has the ability, if he chooses, to
work with his attorneys and to effectively communicate with them.... [T]he
Court is satisfied that if the defendant chooses to do so he is able to assist his
attorneys in preparing his defense.
Id.; see also Barrow, 287 F.3d at 738 (affirming "there was no total breakdown in
communication, only an unwillingness on [the defendant's] part to communicate with
counsel").
202. These denials are not, however, the most severe consequence of a defendant's
misconduct.
Where the court determines that the defendant's misconduct is
"'extremely serious"' the court may find that the defendant forfeited his right to
counsel. United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citation
omitted). In Thomas, the court noted, "'forfeiture results in the loss of a right
regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the
defendant intended to relinquish the right."' Id. at 362 (quoting United States v.
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995)). In this case, four defense lawyers (one
retained, three appointed) were permitted to withdraw before the court found that
the defendant forfeited his right to counsel. Id. at 359-61. In affirming the finding of
forfeiture, the appellate court emphasized that the defendant threatened his counsel
with physical aggression, was uncooperative in preparing a defense, was verbally
abusive, and had attempted to force his lawyer to file frivolous claims with the court.
Id. at 363. In particular, the court was persuaded by the fact that the defendant's
misconduct was consistent during representation by four different lawyers. Id.
203. See Earp, 2003 WL 22368871, at *6 (suggesting where conflict resulted from
defendant's misconduct there was the possibility that it could be "worked out" and
that the facts "do not compel a finding that appellant could not cooperate with his
attorney in the future").
204. See supra 178-79 and accompanying text.
205. See infra Part II.B.4.a.
206. See infra Part II.B.4.b.
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a. Economic Policy
Economic policy plays a crucial, if frequently unstated, role in
While
shaping judges' views of the lawyer-client relationship.
a
legitimate
as
policy
traditional judicial rhetoric dismisses economic
ground on which to base a judicial decision, 07 the reality is that judges
face numerous financial constraints on their administration of
justice.20 8 Accordingly, judges' analyses of alleged breakdowns in the
lawyer-client relationship occasionally reflect concern for the
economic implications of their decisions.0 9 One judge revealingly
framed his inquiry into the breakdown of the lawyer-client
relationship by asking the defendant why the public should bear the
expense of appointing a new lawyer.210 Judges' concerns with fiscal
economy are paralleled by their related concerns with maximizing
judicial economy.
b. Judicial Economy
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that "crowded calendars
throughout the Nation impose a constant pressure on our judges to
finish the business at hand. Generally, they have an interest in having
1
It has been
the trial completed as promptly as possible ....,,
suggested that this concern encourages judges to process criminal12
cases quickly, sometimes to the detriment of other values.
Specifically, this consideration may play a significant role in judges'

207. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 201 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) ("An affluent society ought not be miserly in support of justice, for
economy is not an objective of the system ...").
208. See John, supra note 71, at 159-60 (discussing the numerous financial
constraints facing judges and asserting that "[limited judicial resources force judges
to conduct their courtroom cost-effectively and allocate scarce resources efficiently").
209. See United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979). In Williams, the
appellate court noted of the trial judge that
[o]n each of the two occasions when the Court denied the Motion for
Substitution of Appointed Counsel, he indicated his view that it was
improper, apparently from a policy standpoint, to allow an indigent
defendant with counsel appointed at the expense of the Government to
"fire" his attorney and have another lawyer appointed to act for him.
Id. at 1260.
210. United States v. Myers, 294 F,3d 203, 205 (1st Cir. 2002).
211. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516 n.35 (1978). Consideration for
maximizing judicial economy is also prevalent in civil litigation. See supra note 157
and accompanying text.
212. See Klein, supra note 107, at 552 ("The unfortunate reality in the criminal
courts today is that the judge's primary concern is not with the adequacy of the
representation... but rather to convey the message with which the criminal justice
system is most concerned: move the calendar and process cases as rapidly as
possible."). For an in-depth discussion of how judicial economy impacts judicial
decisions, particularly with respect to plea bargains, see id. at 552-64.
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evaluations of breakdowns of the lawyer-client relationship,1 3
particularly where judges fear that motions to withdraw or to
substitute counsel will be used as a tool to halt the judicial process. 14
One trial judge clearly articulated this concern by explaining his
denial of the defendant's motion to substitute counsel by saying the
following:
If this were done, and the Court has this type of thing come up from
time to time, you never could complete a case, you'd get in the
middle of the case, a defendant, particularly a bright one, raises
some215question and you never could come to the completion of a
trial.

In another case, the reviewing court succinctly characterized the
district court's inquiry into the alleged breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship as "at bottom geared towards forcing the parties to meet
the trial schedule. 2 1 6 While the cases do acknowledge that judges'
desires to achieve maximum judicial economy are not always
controlling, 1 7 the above examples illustrate that it is often a key factor
in judges' decisions. 18
The comparative analysis presented in Part II of this Note
continues to be important in Part III, which draws conclusions
regarding judges' current views of the lawyer-client relationship, and
suggests a procedural revision for its enhanced protection in the
criminal justice system.

213. See Klein, supra note 107, at 571 (describing courts' reluctance to permit
withdrawal or substitution, specifically with regard to appointed lawyers for indigent
criminal defendants, and suggesting a corresponding deterioration of representation);
John, supra note 71, at 160 ("Judges feel pressure to keep their courtrooms and
dockets running smoothly and efficiently. These concerns weigh heavily in judges'
decisions, making delays less desirable and withdrawal less likely."); see also State v.
Irvine, 547 N.W.2d 177, 181 (S.D. 1996) (approving the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to substitute counsel where "[g]ranting the motion would have
only served to further protract the matter. In short, it would have unreasonably
disrupted the judicial process.").
214. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
215. People v. Marsden, 465 P.2d 44, 47 (Cal. 1970) (en banc).
216. United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1998).
217. See United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The
fact that the motion [to substitute counsel] was made on the eve of trial alone is not
dispositive.").
218. See United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2002) ("'Last minute
requests to substitute defense counsel are not favored."' (quoting United States v.
Klein, 13 F.3d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir. 1994))); State v. Johnsen, No. 23856-0-11, 2000 WL
48516, at *2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2000) (affirming trial judge's denial of motion
to withdraw despite recognizing discord in the lawyer-client relationship because of
the relatively advanced procedural posture of the case).
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III. ADDRESSING THE THREAT TO TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP: AN ARGUMENT FOR
PROCEDURAL REFORM

Extreme breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship provoke a
consistent response from judges in civil litigation and in the criminal
justice system: swift termination of the lawyer-client relationship.2

19

The more interesting and difficult cases arise where the breakdown in
the lawyer-client relationship does not render the relationship
adversarial, but merely unpleasant or difficult. In these more subtle

cases, judges perform either an implicit or explicit balancing analysis
to determine whether the lawyer-client relationship should be
sustained.22 This balancing analysis nets markedly different results in

the civil and criminal contexts as judges seem more likely to reject a
motion to withdraw or to substitute counsel in the criminal context,
even where such a motion might be deserving.22' Paradoxically, this

inequity results in less protection for trust and confidence in the
lawyer-client relationship in the criminal justice system, where a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights 222 and liberty are at stake,
than in civil litigation. Given our traditional understanding of the
essential role that trust and confidence plays in an effective legal
representation,2 23 this situation is unavoidably problematic.
This Note argues that judges' skepticism of criminal defendants and
their lawyers, combined with a flawed procedure by which judges
evaluate alleged breakdowns of the lawyer-client relationship, is
largely to blame. While judges are expected to respond to claims of
breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship by conducting their own
inquiry into the matter,224 this inquiry is necessarily limited by the
confidential nature of the lawyer-client relationship. 225 As a result,
judges' inquiries often provide insufficient information by which to
distinguish legitimate and illegitimate breakdowns in the lawyer-client
relationship. Unable to identify the instances of genuine breakdown
219. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1 (discussing the termination of adversarial lawyerclient relationships in civil litigation and the criminal justice system, respectively).
220. See supra Part I.C.2.a; supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (describing
the factors that judges consider when evaluating motions to withdraw in civil
litigation and motions to withdraw and to substitute counsel during a criminal
proceeding).
221. The conclusions expressed in Part III regarding the views and behavior of
judges are necessarily based on a small representative sample of cases. See supra note
75 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text (explaining the scope of a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to legal representation).
223. See supra Part L.A (discussing the role of trust and confidence in the lawyerclient relationship).
224. See supra note 90 (noting the duty of the trial court to inquire into the alleged
breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship).
225. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing the lawyer's ethical
duty to maintain client confidentiality).
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in the lawyer-client relationship, judges in the criminal justice system
appear to rely on their own, often skeptical, presumptions regarding a
criminal defendant's 226 or his lawyer's 227 motivations for alleging a
breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship. Part III.A discusses this
argument in more detail, and compares the impact of client
misconduct on judges' resolutions of withdrawal and substitution of
counsel motions in civil litigation and the criminal justice system to
Then, Part III.B proposes altering the
illustrate this position.
procedure for addressing breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship
in a criminal proceeding so that judges are able to evaluate more
fairly the lawyer-client relationship.
A. A Theory of Judicial Skepticism
Judges' apparent tendency to reject even worthy motions to
22 8
withdraw and to substitute counsel in the criminal context
undermines the fundamental principles of trust and confidence which
define the efficacy of the lawyer-client relationship. If we continue to
accept the long-standing premise that trust and confidence are
essential prerequisites for an effective legal representation,229 then it
follows that a lawyer-client relationship in which these elements are
either wholly lacking or severely compromised should be deemed
On the contrary, however, judges frequently deny
ineffective.
motions to withdraw or to substitute counsel where the relationship
between a criminal defendant and his lawyer is indeed strained such
that trust and confidence is impaired. 23" This contradiction may be
attributed to judges' skeptical views of criminal defendants and their
226. See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing judges' apparent skepticism of criminal
defendants' claims of breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship).
227. See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing judges' skepticism of criminal defense
For further
lawyers' claims of breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship).
discussion of why skepticism directed towards criminal defense lawyers may be
problematic, see infra note 233.
228. One student commentator observed this apparent tendency regarding the
inequitable treatment of motions to withdraw made by appointed and retained
criminal defense lawyers. See John, supra note 71, at 168 ("[P]ublic defenders more
often than not are forced to remain on cases while private attorneys are excused.
Thus, indigency places the defendant in a worse position to obtain a fair defense and
trial than a wealthy client."). Importantly, this Note contends that this inequity
between the civil and criminal contexts exists only where the breakdown of the
lawyer-client relationship is not egregious. As previously discussed, where the
breakdown is so extreme that the lawyer-client relationship becomes adversarial,
judges in both civil and criminal litigation will terminate the lawyer-client
relationship. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
229. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (identifying trust and confidence
in the lawyer-client relationship as an essential precursor to an effective legal
representation).
230. This may be inferred from the number of appellate court reversals of lower
court decisions denying motions to withdraw or to substitute counsel. E.g., United
States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 773 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the district
court failed to identify an obvious breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship).
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lawyers, which heavily influences their evaluations of alleged
breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship.
Judges' opinions regarding motions to withdraw or to substitute
231
counsel reflect an extreme distrust of criminal defendants generally,
and reveal a more specific concern that criminal defendants will either
create or allege artificial breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship
in order to manipulate the judicial system to their advantage.23 2
Alarmingly, some judges seem to have similar concerns of criminal
defense lawyers. 233 This skepticism is conspicuously absent from
judges' treatment of civil litigants and litigators, which may be
explained by noting that the structure of the criminal justice system,
particularly with respect to indigent defendants and appointed
lawyers, provides far greater incentives for the abuse of motions to
withdraw and to substitute counsel. Since indigent defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights to legal representation do not extend to the right
to choose a certain lawyer, 35 criminal defendants who are dissatisfied
with their appointed lawyer must resort to a substitution of counsel
motion in order to secure a new lawyer. Lawyers appointed to
represent indigent defendants are similarly constrained, 36 and must
rely on a judge's grant of their withdrawal motion in order to be
released from a representation.237 In contrast, civil litigants may
231. See supra Part II.B.2.a (suggesting that judicial skepticism of a criminal
defendant's motivation for requesting substitution of counsel is present in a variety of
situations, even extending to those instances where judges recognize the defendant's
genuine dissatisfaction with the representation).
232. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing judges' unflagging
concerns that criminal defendants will manipulate the court).
233. See supra Part II.B.2.b (noting judges' emerging skepticism of criminal
defense lawyers' reasons for seeking withdrawal from a representation). Judges'
skepticism towards lawyers is particularly problematic since it seems to undermine
the lawyer's role as a trusted officer of the court. See supra note 185 (explaining the
Holloway court's presumptive faith in a lawyer's truthful representations).
234. This Note limits its consideration of the effect of the criminal justice system's
incentive structure on defense lawyers to appointed lawyers only. Since the lawyerclient relationship between a criminal defendant and his retained lawyer is somewhat
analogous to the lawyer-client relationship between civil litigants and litigators, its
usefulness as a comparative tool in this Note is minimal. Therefore, for the sake of a
clear comparison of the judiciary's view of the lawyer-client relationship in civil
litigation and in the criminal justice system, discussion of the lawyer-client
relationship between a criminal defendant and his retained lawyer is excluded from
the following analysis and proposal for reform.
235. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing the limitations of an
indigent criminal defendant's constitutional right to the counsel of his choice).
236. All lawyers are limited in their ability to refuse a court appointment See
Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 6.2 (1983) (amended 2003). However, those
working as appointed lawyers in the criminal justice system by definition receive the
lion's share of court appointments.
237. This incentive structure raises a very specific ethical concern: If criminal
defense lawyers will only be relieved from a failed lawyer-client relationship when
they state a claim of egregious breakdown, judges' skepticism of criminal defense
lawyers may actually provide an incentive for these lawyers to breach their ethical
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conduct countless interviews before hiring the lawyer of their choice
and then are free to fire the lawyer at any time.238 It is true that civil
litigators are limited in their ability to withdraw from the lawyer-client
relationship 239 but they face significantly less reluctance from the
bench when requesting relief. 24 ° Judges must be acutely aware of
these differing incentive structures and, perhaps as a result, are
understandably reluctant to credit assertions of a breakdown in the
lawyer-client relationship made by a criminal defendant or his lawyer,
except in the most extreme instances. The following discussion
illustrates how this disbelief translates into judges' seeming inclination
to deny motions to withdraw or to substitute counsel in the criminal
context.
A breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship caused by client
misconduct will have a radically different resolution depending on the
context in which it occurs. In civil litigation, client misconduct excuses
the civil lawyer and affords the civil litigant either a second chance to
achieve a state of trust and confidence with an alternate lawyer or the
option of continuing pro se.241 Since there is little incentive to
manufacture a breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship in civil
litigation, judges have no reason to doubt that client misconduct in
civil litigation is anything other than a visible symptom of breakdown
in the lawyer-client relationship. In the criminal justice system,
however, where the incentive for abuse of motions to withdraw and to
substitute counsel is high, the same type of misconduct by the criminal
defendant will bind the criminal defense lawyer to the representation
and compel a criminal defendant to choose between continuing with
the same lawyer or proceeding pro se.242 The cases suggest that judges
are reluctant to appoint a replacement lawyer in response to a
criminal defendant's misconduct because judges either assume that
the criminal defendant's misconduct is a ploy to gain a tactical
advantage,243 such as a continuance, or dismiss the misconduct as the

duty of candor to the court, see Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3, and exaggerate
the nature of the breakdown in order to be relieved from the representation.
238. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the client's ability to
terminate the lawyer-client relationship at will).
239. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting the limitations on a lawyer's
ability to withdraw from an ongoing representation); see also supra Part I.C.1
(discussing the Model Rules' restrictions on a lawyer's ability to withdraw from the
lawyer-client relationship).
240. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (explaining judges' reluctance
to require specific performance of civil litigators).
241. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing judges' responses to client misconduct during
civil litigation).
242. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing judges' responses to client misconduct during
a criminal proceeding).
243. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.

2005]

A VIEW FROM THE BENCH

2703

criminal defendant's reaction to being the subject of prosecution. 2 "
Since an assertion of breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship is
one of the few ways in which to terminate the relationship between
the indigent defendant and his appointed counsel, this skepticism may
not be entirely undeserved. Judges are not, however, supposed to
make decisions based on their own assumptions regarding the source
of breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship. Instead, judges are
ordinarily expected to conduct inquiries that permit them to make an
informed judgment about the efficacy of the relationship between a
criminal defendant and his lawyer. 245 As the next paragraph of this
Note explains, under the current procedure for evaluating an alleged
breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship, this may be an
unreasonable demand to make of the judiciary.
The current procedure used to evaluate an alleged breakdown in
the lawyer-client relationship fails to provide judges with sufficient
information by which to distinguish manipulative claims from those
that are made in good faith and are deserving of relief. A judge must
act as the sole fact-finder, conducting his own inquiry into the extent
of the breakdown, before ruling on a motion to withdraw or to
substitute counsel. 246 The usefulness of such an inquiry, however, is
severely limited by the confidential nature of the lawyer-client
relationship,2 47 which prevents the judge from asking specific
questions about the nature of the conflict, questions that are arguably
essential for an in-depth understanding of the alleged breakdown, 4 8
but which may result in the revelation of information that is
prejudicial to the defendant.2 49 Further confounding the judge's
inquiry, the defense lawyer is prohibited from disclosing details of the
lawyer-client relationship, and may answer the judges' questions only
in a way that protects lawyer-client confidentiality.25 Too often, these
244. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (noting that criminal
defendants are often understandably upset by the circumstances surrounding their
arrest and prosecution).
245. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
248. Conceivably, a defendant might voluntarily disclose details, which would
adequately describe the alleged breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship so that a
judge might make an informed decision about its efficacy. However, the case law
suggests that, given the complexities of the lawyer-client relationship, some sort of
targeted inquiry will typically be necessary to fully understand the extent of the
alleged breakdown. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
249. Before such inquiries were required, one judge responded to a defendant's
request to discuss specific instances of breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship by
saying "'I don't want you to say anything that might prejudice you before me as to the
case, you see."' People v. Marsden, 465 P.2d 44, 46 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (quoting
colloquy in trial judge's chambers).
250. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that a
lawyer's duty of confidentiality might have on the assessment of an alleged
breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship).
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limitations result in a perfunctory judicial inquiry, one that rarely
yields information sufficient to overcome judges' default stances of
skepticism towards criminal defendants and their lawyers. To cure
this procedural deficiency, it might be necessary for judges to adopt a
revised approach to ruling on motions to withdraw or to substitute
counsel in the criminal justice system, one that facilitates a closer
analysis of claims of breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship.
B. Overcoming JudicialSkepticism: A Proposalfor Reform
Crafting a procedure to rule on withdrawal or substitution of
counsel motions that maintains the sanctity of lawyer-client
confidentiality, and provides judges with a tool to meaningfully
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims that the lawyerclient relationship has been irreparably broken, may be accomplished
by adopting an alternative fact-finding procedure, one that is already
in place for evaluating whether a criminal defendant's waiver of a
conflict-free representation is knowing and intelligent. 2 1 The central
component of this proposal is the appointment of an independent
lawyer who could, in this context, serve a dual purpose. First, the
independent lawyer could substitute for the judge as fact-finder.
Second, the independent lawyer could serve as an intermediary,
helping to restore trust and confidence between a criminal defendant
and his lawyer, and to preserve the efficacy of the original lawyerclient relationship. This part discusses this proposal in detail,252 and
advocates for its adoption in those criminal cases where the alleged
breakdown does not render the lawyer-client relationship obviously
adversarial.
The appointment of an independent lawyer to act as a fact-finder
and a temporary co-counsel to the defendant addresses several
problems inherent in the judiciary's current evaluative procedure.
Importantly, this appointment would reduce the risk that an inquiry
by the judge into the alleged breakdown would intrude on the lawyer-

251. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the Curcio court's
alternative to judicial fact-finding). Analogously, the context in which this alternative
fact-finding procedure is already used, conflicts of interest cases, also requires judges
to consider replacing lawyers in order to avoid a possible impediment to the quality of
the defendant's legal representation.
252. This Note's discussion of this proposal is limited to its substantive elements,
and excludes an analysis of the financial costs associated with appointing an
independent lawyer to assist in evaluating claims of breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship. Opponents may argue that these costs are prohibitive, particularly given
the current economic pressures facing the criminal justice system. See supra Part
II.B.4.a. However, since a similar procedure is available in conflict of interest cases,
see United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 890 (2d Cir. 1982), the author assumes its
continued feasibility in a new context.
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client relationship.253 Such an intrusion by the independent lawyer
would be impossible since he is, briefly, in a privileged relationship
with the defendant. 254 The scope of this relationship would be limited
to assisting and advising the defendant where a claim of breakdown
has been asserted.2 5 Therefore, any inquiry made by the independent
lawyer into the circumstances surrounding the alleged breakdown
falls squarely within his confidential lawyer-client relationship with
the defendant, and is consequently protected.25 6 Significantly, this
protection also permits the independent lawyer to conduct an
exhaustive inquiry into the circumstances of the alleged breakdown,
an advantage that would surely help cure the informational
Finally, the
deficiencies of the present evaluative model.257
appointment of an independent lawyer as a fact-finder may encourage
judges' more trusting considerations of claims of breakdown by
Although the
criminal defendants or their defense lawyers.
confidential nature of his lawyer-client relationship with the
defendant limits the independent lawyer's ability to disclose certain
details of the alleged breakdown to the judge, he, like the defense
lawyer, may make general statements to the judge regarding the
quality of the lawyer-client relationship at issue.25 s While judges
typically seem unreceptive to these conclusory representations,2 59 they
may carry more weight when made by an independent lawyer since,
unlike the criminal defendant or the defense lawyer, the independent
253. For a detailed discussion of the threat posed by judicial fact-finding to the
lawyer-client relationship in conflict of interest cases, see Green, supra note 97, at
1232-33.
254. It is important to note that, unlike his co-counsel, the independent lawyer
could not accurately be described as purely an advocate for the defendant. Instead,
the independent lawyer's role would be better characterized as a hybrid: The
independent lawyer's advocacy for the defendant must be tempered by his duty to
honestly represent to the court the extent of the breakdown in the original lawyerclient relationship.
255. See supra note 97 (describing the Curcio court's conception of the role of the
independent lawyer in conflict of interest cases).
256. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 (1983) (amended 2003).
257. See supra Part III.A (explaining the lack of information regarding an alleged
breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship that is available to judges under the
current evaluative procedure).
258. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (quoting Joe Ed Earp's defense
lawyer's conclusory representation regarding the breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship).
The Model Rules specifically contemplate the use of general
statements as a way in which to communicate a breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship to the court, without compromising the confidentiality of the lawyerclient relationship. See supra note 68; see also Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16
cmt. 3 ("The court may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer
may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an
explanation.
The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require
termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient.").
259. See supra note 185 (discussing the Earp and Aceves courts' unwillingness to
credit the defense lawyers' conclusory representations of breakdown in the lawyerclient relationship at face value).
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lawyer does not have an incentive to create or exaggerate a
breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship. In addition to providing
informational advantages and increased protection for the lawyerclient relationship, the appointment of an independent lawyer to assist
in evaluating breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship might, in
some cases, facilitate its repair.
An independent lawyer's uniquely disinterested position to assess
the alleged breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship may make
him an ideal candidate to broker reconciliation between the criminal
defendant and his lawyer. Judges have already hinted that there are
instances where such reconciliation might be possible by basing their
denials of motions to withdraw or to substitute counsel on the premise
that the particular lawyer-client relationship at issue could be
salvaged.2 6° Unfortunately, judges' current procedure for evaluating
breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship does little to foster this
desired restoration, since the denial of a motion to withdraw or to
substitute counsel effectively shifts the burden back to the criminal
The
defendant and his lawyer to resolve their differences.
independent lawyer contemplated by this proposal might fill this void
by serving as an intermediary between the criminal defendant and his
defense lawyer.
In particular, the independent lawyer might be successful at
mending the lawyer-client relationship where the conflict at issue
arises from the criminal defendant's unreasonable expectations of his
lawyer, which judges often seem to attribute to the defendant's
unfamiliarity with court procedure. 6 1 Another example of this type of
conflict is where the lawyer's candid assessment of the defendant's
chances at trial causes resentment. 62 While judges have found these
types of conflicts insufficient to trigger the complete breakdown of the
lawyer-client relationship, they have identified them as causing
genuine dissatisfaction to criminal defendants. 63 The independent
lawyer's relationship with the defendant could put him in a position to
counsel the defendant with respect to these types of grievances. If, as
judges suggest, these conflicts are really due to the defendant's
misunderstanding of the prosecutorial process, this increased
''264
attention to the defendant's "'dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern
260. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting judges' refusals to end the
lawyer-client relationship where the conflict between the defendant and his lawyer
appears to have a potential resolution).
261. See supra note 181 (noting the Kirvin court's recognition that defendants often
become anxious and frightened if they do not fully understand court proceedings).
262. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (citing numerous instances where
judges attributed a defendant's dissatisfaction with his lawyer to the lawyer's role as
the bearer of bad news).
263. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
264. United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
United States v. Garcia, 924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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might in fact restore the defendant's trust and confidence in his

defense lawyer.
As an example of how this proposal might be practically applied in
the criminal justice system, consider, once again, the case of Joe Ed
Earp.265 In Earp, the trial judge's inquiry into the alleged breakdown
of the lawyer-client relationship yielded predictably little information.
266
Earp's explanation of the breakdown was too succinct to be helpful,
and Earp's defense lawyer, due to the confidential nature of his
relationship with Earp, was able to share only limited information
regarding the breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship with the
court. 267 This information proved unpersuasive, and the trial judge
quickly denied Earp's motion to substitute counsel. 268 Later, an
appellate court affirmed this denial, and expressly approved of the
trial judge's skepticism of Earp and his defense lawyer.269 Perhaps if
an independent lawyer had been appointed to serve as the Earp
court's fact-finder and as Earp's temporary co-counsel, the trial judge
might have been able to reach a decision more consistent with
protecting trust and confidence in the lawyer-client relationship, or at
least one that was better informed.

The assistance of an independent lawyer to evaluate Earp's claim of
breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship would have been
beneficial for several reasons. First, the independent lawyer's ability
to conduct a more searching inquiry into the alleged breakdown,27 °
coupled with the fact that he would not personally benefit if Earp's
motion were granted,27 1 might have successfully countered the judge's
Also, if counseled by an
skepticism of Earp and his lawyer.
265. People v. Earp, No. F041724, 2003 WL 22368871, at *1 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003); see also supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text
(introducing Earp as illustrative of the systemic problem in the criminal justice system
with regard to evaluating alleged breakdowns in the lawyer-client relationship, which
is the subject of this Note).
266. Initially, Earp's statement was only that "'I want somebody else. This is
bullshit here."' Earp, 2003 WL 22368871, at *4. Later, in response to the judge's
explanation that substitution of counsel required a specific ground for terminating the
existing lawyer-client relationship, Earp replied that "'anybody... could see I was set
up on the whole thing."' Id. (alteration in original).
267. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (quoting Earp's defense lawyer's
statement to the court, which confirmed the alleged breakdown in the lawyer-client
relationship and specifically noted that his disclosure was necessarily limited).
Additionally, the appellate court noted that "[t]here was nothing concrete adduced at
the hearing which supported a conclusion that defense counsel could not adequately
represent [Earp] despite the difficulties he had with [Earp]." Earp, 2003 WL
22368871, at *6.
268. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting the lower court's denial of
Earp's motion to substitute counsel).
269. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing one judge's belief that
criminal defense lawyers might seek to withdraw from a representation where doing
so would assure them a more attractive caseload).
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independent lawyer, Earp might have been able to give a statement to
the judge that more clearly articulated his dissatisfaction with the
lawyer-client relationship. 272 Finally, with regard to the independent
lawyer's restorative function, it is possible that if an independent
lawyer had been available to explain the intricacies of the court
proceedings to Joe Ed Earp, he might have understood his appointed
lawyer's "'collusion ' '2 73 with the prosecutor not as disloyalty, but
rather as merely the routine interaction between opposing advocates
during criminal litigation. 274 As this discussion suggests, the proposal
advocated by this Note provides several alternative avenues for
protection of trust and confidence in the lawyer-client relationship in
the criminal justice system. Therefore, its adoption deserves serious
consideration.
CONCLUSION

The lawyer-client relationship lies at the very foundation of the
American legal system and its continued preservation is therefore
imperative. Historically, the bench and the bar have fulfilled this
mandate by emphasizing trust and confidence as the central principles
of the lawyer-client relationship.2 75 Currently the procedure for
assessing claims of breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship, 76
which is unavoidably limited by the confidential nature of the lawyerclient relationship,277 presents a significant obstacle to the judiciary's
continual focus on trust and confidence.278 Still, these core values
272. On appeal, the appellate court noted that Earp "admits that he did not
demonstrate by his own statements sufficient cause . . . for substitution of counsel."
Earp, 2003 WL 22368871, at *5. Since Earp clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with
his representation, see supra note 266 and accompanying text, this statement by the
appellate court supports the widely held belief that something more than the
defendant's dissatisfaction is required to terminate the lawyer-client relationship, see
supra note 165 and accompanying text. Where the facts and circumstances genuinely
support that an irreconcilable breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship exists, an
independent lawyer might be helpful in advising a criminal defendant on how to best
articulate this conflict to the court.
273. Earp, 2003 WL 22368871, at *4.
274. As this Note argues, an independent lawyer might have been particularly
successful at restoring Earp's trust and confidence in his defense lawyer since the
appellate court attributed Earp's dissatisfaction in part to the fact that he was
unfamiliar with the complexities of the criminal proceedings. See supra note 182 and
accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing the central role of
trust and confidence in the lawyer-client relationship).
276. See supra Parts I.C.2.a-b (discussing the procedural framework for resolving
motions to withdraw or to substitute counsel in civil litigation and the criminal justice
system, respectively).
277. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text (discussing the way in which
confidentiality limits judges' inquiries into an alleged breakdown of the lawyer-client
relationship).
278. See supra Part III.A (analyzing in depth the limitations of the current
procedure for evaluating alleged breakdowns of the lawyer-client relationship).
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criminal justice system, however, judges' skepticism of criminal
defendants and their lawyers, 28 exacerbated by a lack of reliable
information regarding the circumstances of alleged breakdowns,281

results in comparably less protection for trust and confidence.282
Reforming the procedure by which judges evaluate a breakdown in
the lawyer-client relationship is therefore a critical step towards
protecting trust and confidence in the lawyer-client relationship.
Appointing an independent lawyer as the court's fact-finder removes
the risk that an inquiry into the breakdown would undermine the
confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship2 83 and solves the
informational deficiency posed by the current evaluative model.2 8
Additionally, the independent lawyer may be able to reconcile the
differences between a criminal defendant and his lawyer.2 85 Surely,
we should not abandon our historical aspirations so readily. Criminal
defendants, such as Joe Ed Earp, are entitled to the same level of trust
and confidence in the lawyer-client relationship as is routinely found
in civil litigation.

279. See supra Part II.A (presenting a thematic analysis of judges' views of the
lawyer-client relationship, and approach to its termination, in civil litigation).
280. See supra Parts II.B.2.a-b (exploring judges' apparent skepticism of criminal
defendants and defense lawyers).
281. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (discussing judges' hesitancy to act
on general information regarding the alleged breakdown of the lawyer-client
relationship).
282. See supra Part III.A (concluding that trust and confidence receives less
protection in the criminal justice system than in civil litigation).
283. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (discussing how this proposal
mitigates the risk of judicial fact-finding).
284. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (explaining the informational
advantages provided by this proposal).
285. See supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that
the independent lawyer contemplated by this proposal might aid in the reconciliation
of a criminal defendant and his lawyer).
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